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Executive summary
Objective
The aims of this study were to identify the impact of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza on 
Australian Emergency Departments (EDs) and their staff, and to inform planning, preparedness, 
and response management arrangements for future pandemics, as well as managing infectious 
patients presenting to EDs in everyday practice.
Methods
This study involved three elements:
1. The first element of the study was an examination of published material including published 
statistics. Standard literature research methods were used to identify relevant published 
articles. In addition, data about ED demand was obtained from Australian Government 
Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA) publications, with several state health 
departments providing more detailed data.
2. The second element of the study was a survey of Directors of Emergency Medicine identified 
with the assistance of the Australasian College for Emergency Medicine (ACEM). This 
survey retrieved data about demand for ED services and elicited qualitative comments on the 
impact of the pandemic on ED management.
3. The third element of the study was a survey of ED staff. A questionnaire was emailed to 
members of three professional colleges—the ACEM; the Australian College of Emergency 
Nursing (ACEN); and the College of Emergency Nursing Australasia (CENA). The overall 
response rate for the survey was 18.4%, with 618 usable responses from 3355 distributed 
questionnaires. Topics covered by the survey included ED conditions during the (H1N1) 
2009 influenza pandemic; information received about Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza; 
pandemic plans; the impact of the pandemic on ED staff with respect to stress; illness 
prevention measures; support received from others in work role; staff and others’ illness 
during the pandemic; other factors causing ED staff to miss work during the pandemic; and 
vaccination against Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. Both qualitative and quantitative data 
were collected and analysed.
Results
The results obtained from Directors of Emergency Medicine quantifying the impact of the 
pandemic were too limited for interpretation. Data sourced from health departments and 
published sources demonstrated an increase in influenza-like illness (ILI) presentations of 
between one and a half and three times the normal level of presentations of ILIs. Directors of 
Emergency Medicine reported a reasonable level of preparation for the pandemic, with most 
reporting the use of pandemic plans that translated into relatively effective operational infection 
control responses. Directors reported a highly significant impact on EDs and their staff from the 
pandemic. Growth in demand and related ED congestion were highly significant factors causing 
distress within the departments. Most (64%) respondents established a ‘flu clinic’ either as part of 
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the ED operations or external to it. They did not note a significantly higher rate of sick leave than 
usual.
Responses relating to the impact on staff were proportional to the size of the colleges. Most 
respondents felt strongly that Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza had a significant impact on 
demand in their ED, with most patients having low levels of clinical urgency. Most respondents 
felt that the pandemic had a negative impact on the care of other patients, and 94% revealed 
some increase in stress due to lack of space for patients, increased demand, and filling staff 
deficits. Levels of concern about themselves or their family members contracting the illness 
were less significant than expected. Nurses displayed significantly higher levels of stress overall, 
particularly in relation to skill-mix requirements, lack of supplies and equipment, and patient and 
patients’ family aggression. More than one-third of respondents became ill with an ILI. Whilst 
respondents themselves reported taking low levels of sick leave, respondents cited difficulties 
with replacing absent staff. Ranked from highest to lowest, respondents gained useful support 
from ED colleagues, ED administration, their hospital occupational health department, hospital 
administration, professional colleges, state health department, and their unions. Respondents were 
generally positive about the information they received overall; however, the volume of information 
was considered excessive and sometimes inconsistent. The media was criticised as scaremongering 
and sensationalist and as being the cause of many unnecessary presentations to EDs. Of concern 
to the investigators was that a large proportion (43%) of respondents did not know whether a 
pandemic plan existed for their department or hospital. A small number of staff reported being 
redeployed from their usual workplace for personal risk factors or operational reasons. As at the 
time of survey (29 October –18 December 2009), 26% of ED staff reported being vaccinated 
against Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. Of those not vaccinated, half indicated they would 
‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ not get vaccinated, with the main reasons being the vaccine was ‘rushed 
into production’, ‘not properly tested’, ‘came out too late’, or not needed due to prior infection or 
exposure, or due to the mildness of the disease.
Conclusion
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza had a significant impact on Australian Emergency Departments. 
The pandemic exposed problems in existing plans, particularly a lack of guidelines, general 
information overload, and confusion due to the lack of a single authoritative information 
source. Of concern was the high proportion of respondents who did not know if their hospital 
or department had a pandemic plan. Nationally, the pandemic communication strategy needs 
a detailed review, with more engagement with media networks to encourage responsible and 
consistent reporting. Also of concern was the low level of immunisation, and the low level of 
intention to accept vaccination. This is a problem seen in many previous studies relating to 
seasonal influenza and health care workers. The design of EDs needs to be addressed to better 
manage infectious patients. Significant workforce issues were confronted in this pandemic, 
including maintaining appropriate staffing levels; staff exposure to illness; access to, and 
appropriate use of, personal protective equipment (PPE); and the difficulties associated with 
working in PPE for prolonged periods. An administrative issue of note was the reporting 
requirement, which created considerable additional stress for staff within EDs. Peer and local 
support strategies helped ensure staff felt their needs were provided for, creating resilience, 
dependability, and stability in the ED workforce. Policies regarding the establishment of flu clinics 
need to be reviewed. The ability to create surge capacity within EDs by considering staffing, 
equipment, physical space, and stores is of primary importance for future pandemics.  
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Acronyms and abbreviations
Acronym/abbreviation Definition
ACEM Australasian College for Emergency Medicine
ACEN Australian College of Emergency Nursing
ACOEM American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine
ACT Australian Capital Territory
ADON Assistant Director of Nursing
AHMPPI Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza 
2008
ANZICS Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society
APIC Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemi-
ology Inc.
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DON Director of Nursing
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ED Emergency Department
FACEM Fellow of the Australian College for Emergency Medicine
GP General Practitioner
H Haemagglutinin
ICU Intensive Care Unit
IDSA Infectious Diseases Society of America
ILI Influenza-like Illness
IQR InterQuartileRank
LMO Local Medical Officer
MeSH Medical Subject Headings
MPERT Mobile Paediatric Emergency Response Team 
N Neuraminidase
ND Nursing Director
NH&MRC National Health and Medical Research Council
NP Nurse Practitioner
NSW New South Wales
NSW Health  New South Wales Health
NT Northern Territory
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Acronym/abbreviation Definition
NUM Nursing Unit Manager
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PPE Personal protective equipment
Q Health Queensland Health
Qld Queensland
RBWH Royal Brisbane Women’s Hospital
RCH Royal Children’s Hospital
RN Registered Nurse
SA South Australia
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SD Standard Deviation
SESIAHS South Eastern Sydney and Illawarra Area Health Service
SHEA Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
SMO Senior Medical Officer
Tas  Tasmania
TGA Therapeutic Goods Administration
UK United Kingdom
USA United States of America
Vic Victoria
VIDRL Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory
VIP Very Important Person
WA Western Australia
WHO World Health Organization
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1. Introduction
Emergency Departments (EDs) and ambulance services are at the forefront of Australia’s health 
disaster response providing immediate patient care, system wide coordination, and retrieval and 
transfer of patients. The recent outbreak of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza demonstrated 
the diversity of roles EDs play in disease containment and management. Public awareness of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza and concern about the potential severity of the disease led to a 
large number of patients presenting to both EDs and primary health services, including General 
Practitioners (GPs) and ambulance services. However, the extent of the impact of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza on EDs and their staff has not previously been documented in detail.
The Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak had a significant impact on EDs with large 
numbers of patients presenting with influenza-like illness (ILI), which caused considerable 
demands on ED staff and further impeded the management and flow of ED patients1, 2. This 
occurred at a time when EDs in Australia are confronting continual problems of overcrowding 
associated with ‘access block’ and growing service demands. EDs had to respond to the additional 
demand caused by the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak and to implement specific 
precautions to safely manage these patients, whilst also protecting staff members and non-affected 
patients and visitors from potential cross-contamination.
The response by EDs to the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak occurred during a period 
of evolving knowledge about the disease. Initial reports from Mexico raised serious concerns 
regarding the severity of the disease and the mortality rate. Although the severity was subsequently 
shown to be of less concern, the initial response was, and necessarily had to be, based on the 
information available at the time.
The aim of this study was to identify the impact of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza in Australia 
on ED operations and staff; to inform future planning, preparedness, and response management 
arrangements for pandemics; and to inform the management of infectious patients presenting to 
EDs in every day practice.
2. Background
Influenza pandemics
Influenza viruses are myxoviruses, with three main genera—Influenza A, B, and C—all of which 
are capable of causing infection in humans3, 4. Influenza A is responsible for epidemics, and 
occasional pandemics in humans5. Influenza B does not cross the species barrier, but can cause 
epidemics4. Influenza C has, to date, only caused mild illness, and does not cause epidemics4, 6.
The outer coat of the influenza virus has two antigens: haemagglutinin (H), which anchors 
the virus to cells it invades; and neuraminidase (N), which helps the virus both enter and exit 
individual host cells. Influenza A subtypes are named according to which antigen they possess. 
Humans manufacture antibodies to these antigens during the immune response4. Only Influenza 
A subtypes H1, H2, and H3 have been readily transmitted between humans. However, these 
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antigens are altered over time by a process of drift (repeated minor mutations), or shift when 
two different influenza viruses invade a host simultaneously and recombine to produce marked 
changes in surface antigens6. Shift commonly occurs in Influenza A, but not in Influenza B or C. 
Haemagglutinin is used in the manufacture vaccines. The influenza virus is able to change this 
outer surface antigen frequently, which means annual changes are needed in the manufacture of 
influenza vaccines3, 4, 6.
An ‘epidemic’ is defined as the sudden increase in the incidence of a disease within a defined 
locality4. A ‘pandemic’ is defined as the spread of a disease outside a community and across the 
world4. Pandemics can persist for months, years, or decades, and pandemic influenza includes 
rapid transmission with the disease occurring outside usual seasonal patterns, with high attack 
rates across all age groups and high mortality rates in young, healthy adults6. Epidemics and 
pandemics of influenza occur when a new virus emerges, or an existing virus mutates sufficiently 
for little or no immunity to exist3, 4. Influenza pandemics have occurred regularly over the course 
of history. They arise when a virus develops to which the population has little or no immunity, and 
efficient human-to-human transmission occurs. 
The predominant virus type causing epidemics has evolved over time. The so-called Spanish 
Flu of 1918–19 was caused by an Influenza A virus of subtype H1N1. It killed more people than 
were killed in World War I7. Recent reconstruction of this virus shows marked similarity to swine 
influenza viruses of the H1N1 type isolated in pigs since the 1930s. The Spanish Flu killed an 
estimated 40–50 million people across the world when the world’s population was 1.7 billion. 
Subsequent influenza pandemics occurred in 1957 (‘Asian Flu’ caused by H2N2); in 1968 (‘Hong 
Kong Flu’ caused by H3N2); in late 1976 (the re-emergence of H1N1, which caused an outbreak at 
a North American military base); and in 1977 the ‘Russian Flu’8, 9. The 1976 outbreak was feared 
to be the start of a pandemic of similar proportions to that of 1918–19, so a vaccine was rapidly 
rolled out and US citizens were compulsorily immunised. This immunisation campaign was 
halted when a higher than normal rate of Guillain–Barré Syndrome was detected amongst those 
immunised and a pandemic failed to eventuate10.
Previous major pandemics occurred before the development of many modern health care 
innovations that are now considered as standard care. During the 1918–19 Spanish Flu pandemic, 
most people died from bacterial infections. This was before the development of antibiotics11. In 
Australia, the 1968 pandemic occurred when intensive care units were only in a developmental 
stage8.
Since 1918–19, there have been many changes in society that have altered the potential risk profile 
of the community. Populations in large cities are bigger and populations are also relatively far 
more mobile. High-speed international travel means that pandemics spread around the world 
very quickly4. Travel during the incubation period of viruses devalues any benefits of border 
controls. However, there are also positive societal changes that may mitigate some of these risks. 
Populations are now healthier with fewer chronic infectious diseases (particularly tuberculosis); 
people in the developed world live mostly in relatively isolated, separate quarters and benefit from 
better environmental standards and have more access to sophisticated medical care than in 1918–
194.
The impact of infectious diseases on the burden of disease in developed countries has reduced 
considerably over the last century, due to the development of antibiotics and the introduction 
of infection control practices. However, in developing countries, illnesses such as HIV/AIDS, 
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tuberculosis and malaria, together with vaccine preventable childhood diseases5 remain significant 
contributors to both mortality and disease burden4. The outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, followed by Avian Influenza (H5N1), raised awareness of the potential 
impact of novel viruses on human health and led to enhanced preparedness for pandemic 
management. Avian Influenza is spread by migratory birds, is highly infectious for chickens, and 
lethal when contracted by humans with a mortality rate of 60%4. Concern that H5N1 may mutate 
into a human-to-human transmissible form has sensitised the world to potential impact of a major 
pandemic.
The (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic
History and overview
The emergence of a Swine Influenza virus that causes human disease resulted in international 
alarm. Though infection is novel, this virus is not new and is thought to have been undetected 
within herds of swine for quite some time prior to human infection, evidenced by the lack of 
similarity between the Swine Influenza and its nearest relatives9, 12.
In March and early April 2009, a larger than usual number of cases of ILI were detected in 
Mexico3, 13. This was first reported to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) on 12 April, 
and enhanced surveillance began in Mexico on 17 April. On 23 April it was shown that the virus 
involved was the same as that found in two children in Texas on 15 April, and in two more children 
in California on 17 April. On 23 April, the Public Health Agency in Canada confirmed similar 
cases13. A lack of contact with pigs in all the reported cases led to the conclusion that transmission 
of the virus was human to human9, 13.
Investigations revealed the virus was an Avian Influenza virus, which had not previously been 
known to cause human disease. The virus is known by various names—Swine Flu, swine-origin 
influenza A (H1N1) virus (S-OIV) infection; Pandemic (H1N1) 2009; and Novel Influenza 
A (H1N1) Virus. Throughout this paper it is referred to as Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza is a quadruple reassortment virus, with North American and 
Eurasian swine strains combining with one avian and one human strain12.
On 25 April 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) determined that member states and 
partners should increase their surveillance programs and prepare for an epidemic14. Australia 
activated its pandemic plan, The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza 2008 
(AHMPPI 2008)19, in line with this recommendation15. Two days later, the WHO determined 
that, given the extent of the spread of the disease, containment would not be possible. Countries 
were advised not to institute border control measures, but to implement plans to lessen the impact 
of the outbreak. On 27 April, the WHO advised that given the evidence of sustained human-to-
human infection, countries should aim for early detection, management, and implementation of 
appropriate infection control procedures14, and to upgrade assessment of the pandemic from Level 
4 to Level 5 (see Figure 1). Australia’s first Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza case was reported on 
9 May16. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza appeared to be both highly contagious and virulent. By 
29 May, Mexico reported 4910 confirmed cases and 85 deaths17.
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Figure 1  World Health Organization pandemic phases18
Australia’s response
The AHMPPI 200819 was activated on 25 April 2009 when the WHO advised increased 
surveillance for unusual outbreaks of ILI and pneumonia and recommended appropriate case 
management strategies and strengthened infection control measures in health14. Before the virus 
arrived in Australia, there were predictions of a high mortality rate related to the virus15. The first 
case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza in Australia was in a person who arrived on a flight from 
Los Angeles on 7 May 2009. The person had been ill in the USA from 27 April, and approached 
staff at Brisbane Airport to inform them on arrival. The swab returned a weak positive result on 9 
May and she was deemed non-infectious20. On 18 May, the first cases were reported in Victoria in 
three brothers who had recently returned from the USA. Surveillance systems showed the virus 
spread quickly and it rapidly became the predominant strain over seasonal influenza16, 21. These 
events are summarised in Table 1.
Table 1  Australian Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza timeline
28 April Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza designated a quarantinable disease.
Border surveillance strengthened.
The Australian Pandemic Phase upgraded from the ALERT Phase to DELAY 
Phase.
30 April Full border measures implemented, with thermal scanners in eight 
Australian international airports following WHO upgrade of Influenza 
Pandemic Alert Phase 4 to Influenza Pandemic Alert Phase 5.
National freecall Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 hotline and health emergency 
website established.
9 May Australia has first confirmed case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza 
with person in Queensland testing weak positive. The person arrived in 
Brisbane on 7 May from Los Angeles.
As a precaution, health authorities contact traced people on the same 
flight.
21 May Four more Australians tested positive to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009—three in 
Victoria and one in NSW.
22 May South Australia had first confirmed case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
Pandemic alert level escalated to CONTAIN.
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23 May NSW Health advised by Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service 
that cruise ship, Dawn Princess, travelling from Hawaii to Sydney had 
passengers on board with influenza like illness. NSW Health with 
DoHA, requested delayed disembarkation of passengers and crew for 
assessment of symptoms by Public Health Officials. Passengers and crew 
then disembarked the ship and were instructed to stay in isolation until 
tests results known.
24 May Results for passengers on board the Dawn Princess cruise ship negative 
for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
25 May Western Australia had first confirmed case.
27 May As a precaution for its visit to the Whitsunday Islands, the Pacific Dawn 
cruise ship sailed to Willis Island to allow extra time at sea to test those 
who developed symptoms and to monitor for development of further 
cases. Three people on the ship tested positive for influenza. Swabs 
taken for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. All passengers from previous cruise had 
disembarked in Sydney, with crew given Oseltamivir and any showing ILI 
symptoms sent off the ship.
28 May The Chief Medical Officer approved first release of antivirals from the 
National Medical Stockpile.
Queensland Health confirmed three crew members on the Pacific Dawn 
tested positive for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
29 May Pacific Dawn diverted back to Brisbane.
30 May Queensland Health prepared for Pacific Dawn arrival in Brisbane. Other 
passengers isolated after showing ILI symptoms.
31 May The Northern Territory announced first case of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. All 
Australian states and territories now had at least one confirmed case.
1 June NSW Health advised Pacific Dawn cruise ship passengers all returned 
negative results for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
3 June Containment measures in place in Sydney for arrival of Dawn Princess 
cruise ship turned away from Noumea after passengers with ILI 
symptoms.
11 June WHO Director-General, Dr Margaret Chan, escalated level of influenza 
pandemic alert from Phase 5 to Phase 6, recognising continued spread of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza around the world, with sustained human-
to-human community level transmission. Acknowledged causing mainly 
moderate disease.
17 June New pandemic phase PROTECT created to guide ongoing Australian 
response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. Recognised Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 not as severe as envisaged when AHMPPI written in 2008. 
PROTECT to sit alongside CONTAIN and SUSTAIN phases with greater 
focus on treatment and care for people experiencing severe disease.
Jurisdictions made arrangements to move to this level 26 June.
18 September Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) announced registration of CSL 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza vaccine.
30 September All States and Territories offered free vaccine to adults and children 10 
years and over.
Note: All dates and information in Table 1 derived from the Australian Government Department of Health and 
Ageing’s (DoHA) Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza news archive22.
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Australia’s Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza phases are summarised in Table 2.
Table 2  Australian Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza phases23
As at 9 April 2010, there were 37,693 confirmed cases of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza in 
Australia, with 191 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza related deaths24. However, the number of 
reported cases vastly under-represents the total number of cases, because testing was deliberately 
phased out in the SUSTAIN phase of the disease. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza was the 
dominant influenza of the 2009 winter season. Whilst the peak incidence of Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Influenza in Australia was in September 2009, sporadic cases continued throughout the 
summer. The disease has continued throughout the northern hemisphere during the winter. 
The laboratory-confirmed cases are a small proportion of the health burden that occurs during 
any outbreak. The major burden of disease during pandemics is carried by those with relatively 
Australian phase Description
ALERT
DELAY
CONTAIN
SUSTAIN PROTECT
CONTROL
RECOVER
A novel virus with pandemic potential causes severe disease in 
humans who have had contact with infected animals. There is no 
effective transmission between humans. Novel virus has not 
arrived in Australia.
Effective transmission of novel virus detected overseas in either:
•  small cluster of cases in one country overseas
•  large clusters of cases in only one or two countries overseas
•  large clusters of cases in more than two countries overseas.
Novel virus not detected in Australia.
Pandemic virus has 
arrived in Australia 
causing a small 
number of cases or a 
small number of 
clusters.
Pandemic virus is 
established in Australia 
and spreading in the 
community.
A pandemic virus that 
is mild in most, but 
severe in some, and 
moderate overall is 
established in 
Australia.
Customised pandemic 
vaccine widely available 
and is beginning to 
bring the pandemic 
under control.
Pandemic controlled in 
Australia, but further 
waves may occur if the 
virus drifts or is 
re-imported into 
Australia.
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mild illness who do not seek or require medical care. In determining the whole clinical impact of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, there are a number of categories to assess:
1. ‘proven’ cases including: 
a. those with mild symptoms managed at home 
b. those needing hospital admission 
c. those with Intensive Care Unit (ICU) admission 
d. those dying
2. patients with the disease who are not tested
3. patients with different, but similar diseases
4. patients who are concerned, but not unwell 
5. family, friends, and contacts who require prophylaxis.
Many patients with ILI who are concerned they have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza will 
present for assessment. In many of these patients, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza will be a 
differential diagnosis and the inherent delay in obtaining confirmed diagnosis requires provisional 
prophylactic intervention for the patient and their immediate contacts. At times, the extent of 
these contacts may be extreme—for example, all other passengers on an airliner or all children in a 
school. Therefore, the major burden of disease during a pandemic such as that experienced in 2009 
is largely experienced by those who do not have a serious disease.
Clinical profile and impact on Emergency Departments
Early in the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak, there was concern that a mild outbreak 
could lead to accusations of scaremongering and cause reduced future compliance with public 
health emergency initiatives25. As the pandemic progressed, there was a view that a great deal of 
unnecessary alarm was created by the media26. Even as early as July 2009, a small study in Sydney 
found a low level of community anxiety about Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. However, the 
authors of this study felt that the media played a significant part in the community’s acceptance 
and positive attitude towards quarantine as an infection control measure27.
At the commencement of this outbreak, in the first instance health departments directed patients 
with ILI to ED28, with television and newspapers reporting ensuing chaos29–36. In the USA, large 
influxes of patients with influenza symptoms were reported to be attending EDs, and all patients 
were tested for the virus, including those without symptoms. This increased demand on EDs was 
related to the extent of the disease in the community, the degree of testing for the disease within 
the community, and the interest the local media showed in the outbreak37.
Over time and with the accumulation of data, it became evident that Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza had a high infection rate, but mainly caused mild to moderate disease, with the usual 
features of influenza—fever ≥38.0oC, sore throat, cough, runny nose, chills, head and body aches, 
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and fatigue. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza differed from usual seasonal influenza because 
approximately half of the cases had associated nausea, abdominal pain, and diarrhoea38, and 
because it affected predominantly younger age groups21, whereas the major impact of seasonal 
influenza is on the elderly4. It is thought that older people may have cross-reactive antibodies from 
exposure to a similar virus in the past39. However, when people over the age of 65 are infected with 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, they have the highest mortality rate of any age group40. The 
mortality rate from Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza is lower than that from seasonal influenza, 
though the people who died were typically younger than those who die from seasonal influenza41. 
In severe cases, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza causes extremely severe lung disease resulting 
in higher rates of ICU admissions than seasonal influenza, and a need for advanced ventilation and 
oxygenation techniques such as Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO). The most 
severe respiratory failure occurs in patients aged less than 50 years, with many requiring prolonged 
ventilation42–47.
Those at higher risk of severe disease as a result of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza included 
pregnant women; children aged six months to 10 years on long-term aspirin therapy; adults who 
were moderately to morbidly obese; people with pre-existing respiratory problems, especially 
asthma; those with pre-existing cardiovascular disease; immunosupressed people; people 
with chronic illnesses such as diabetes and metabolic, liver, and neural diseases; people with 
haemoglobinopathies; homeless people; and people from Indigenous backgrounds38, 48, 49. The 
higher vulnerability of Indigenous Australians highlighted the need for culturally sensitive and 
specific information and health care to be delivered by trusted individuals to this sector of the 
community50. Whilst an early report suggested that vaccination with previous seasonal vaccines 
offered no protection against the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza virus in any age group16, a 
later report from Mexico suggested that some protection was conferred by the 2008–09 trivalent 
inactivated vaccine, especially against severe forms of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza51. Another 
recent report, compiled from four studies in Canada, concluded that those who received the 
seasonal 2008–09 trivalent vaccine were more likely to contract Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza 
than those who had not been vaccinated52. There is obviously more work to be done in this area.
The planning context for pandemics
Planning for pandemics requires building large-scale surge capacity into the health care system. 
Unlike other disasters, pandemics last for up to 7–10 months, and can cause significant health, 
economic, and social impacts for extended periods53.
In 2004, the WHO developed a checklist for developing pandemic plans. The essential features 
of the checklist included preparation for an emergency, surveillance, investigation of cases and 
treatment, prevention of community spread, maintenance of essential services, research and 
evaluation, and the implementation, testing and revision of the plan5. In Australia, the DoHA 
devised the AHMPPI, which was tested using a simulation exercise in 2006, called ‘Exercise 
Cumpston 06’. Key recommendations that emerged from Exercise Cumpston 06 included 
streamlining decision-making processes, increased flexibility to respond according to the severity 
of the pandemic and the available resources; improved communication systems including sharing 
information between jurisdictions; public health education campaigns ahead of time; a national 
surveillance framework; clarification of quarantine, border control, and emergency legislation; 
and integration of primary care providers in pandemic planning54. In 2008, ‘Exercise Sustain 
08’ was held to further review the AHMPPI for government preparedness at a national level to 
respond to and recover from pandemic influenza. Exercise Sustain 08 underscored the impact 
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a pandemic would have, both during the outbreak and in the recovery phase, on all facets of the 
community. It identified differences between the response required during a pandemic, and that 
required for other disaster situations such as floods, fires, and mass casualty situations, which are 
usually geographically defined and of shorter duration53. Exercise Sustain 08 also stressed that it is 
impossible to plan for all eventualities, given that it is impossible to predict the characteristics of a 
new virus. Community empowerment on a local level emerged as an issue from Exercise Sustain 
08, and it was recommended neighbourhood leaders and existing community groups should be 
identified and involved in pandemic planning. The notion of clearly defined social distancing also 
emerged as an important prevention strategy. The impact of social distancing on the health care 
workforce was also examined. The need for defined criteria for measures such as school closures 
was identified. A way of developing a productive relationship with the media was also identified, 
with an emphasis on timeliness, transparency, and honesty to earn the trust of the community. 
The importance of the credibility of the person delivering the messages was also identified, with 
health professionals rather than politicians being considered more likely to instil confidence in the 
community37, 53. The findings of a recent Australian study echoed the importance of credibility, 
and also emphasised the need for local sources of information55.
Worldwide, health care systems have few surplus resources. However, the ability to expand 
capacity to meet health needs during a crisis is imperative. This concept, known as ‘surge capacity’ 
has been defined as, ‘the ability to manage a sudden, unexpected increase in patient volume (i.e. 
numbers of patients) that would otherwise severely challenge or exceed the current capacity 
of the health care system’56. Surge capacity can be created in a number of ways. It is recognised 
that during a pandemic, non-essential and non-emergency functions within hospitals may need 
to be suspended for the duration of the crisis. This may include cancelling elective surgery and 
admissions, earlier than usual discharge of patients, removal of ambulatory care from hospitals, 
and reallocation of physical space and roles56. Staff and volunteers need specialised training in 
advance; supplies such as ventilators, drugs, and PPE need to be stockpiled; and there must be 
increased capacity for cleaning and security and crowd management. Morgue facilities must also 
be able to expand, and laboratory capacity may need to expand exponentially. Screening, testing, 
and prophylaxis must be available for health care workers to protect them and enable them to 
keep working. There is also increased need for non-medical staff to fulfil roles in administration, 
communication, transportation, and security and crowd control. However, surge capacity applies 
across the entire community, with health, government, and community groups required to act in 
an integrated and cooperative manner. When individual hospitals reach the limit of their capacity 
to cope, they must be able move patients or services to other hospitals or centres25, 57. Illness 
amongst health care workers also increases pressure within the system. Resultant loss of workforce 
numbers needs to be planned for and covered by casual staff, retired staff, and volunteers56.
All Australian states have pandemic plans designed to complement or augment the AHMPPI58–66. 
These plans agree that flu clinics should be established to minimise the impact of a pandemic on 
EDs. Flu clinics allow EDs to continue to meet emergency care needs of communities. Pandemic 
plans also recommend separating influenza patients from other patients at triage, with the 
designation of ‘flu hospitals’ to keep those infected separated from patients who do not have the 
virus. Other recommendations include priority vaccination for at-risk staff, pre- and post-exposure 
prophylaxis for staff who come into contact with suspected and confirmed cases, and the use of 
PPE with access to pandemic stockpiles as required. Hospital staff are expected to self-isolate if 
exposed or ill58–66.
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The attack on the World Trade Center in the USA on 11 September 2001, the experience of SARS 
in 2002–03, various threats of biological warfare, and the Asian Tsunami on 26 December 2004 
have heightened worldwide awareness of the need for medical communities to develop plans 
to create surge capacity within hospitals and communities to better cope in a pandemic or mass 
casualty situation.
The operational context of Emergency Departments
EDs and ambulance services form the core of Australia’s emergency medical system. These 
services not only manage the daily workload associated with individual health emergencies, but 
also form the core of the immediate health response to major incidents and disasters. Pandemics 
pose a particular challenge to Australia’s health system as they can result in a widespread and 
prolonged increase in demand for health care, which may challenge the capacity of the health 
system.
There are longstanding crowding problems in Australian EDs. Since the 1990s, the greatest 
contributing factor to overcrowding in EDs is ‘access block’67. Access block occurs when patients 
requiring an inpatient bed are unable to be transferred to inpatient areas, and remain in the ED 
for prolonged periods. Access block is an indication of systemic problems within the hospital 
system rather than inefficiencies within the ED. Decreases in bed requirements due to reduced 
lengths of hospital stays have been outstripped by the increase in patient numbers. Many patients 
have increasingly complex health problems. An ageing population, and an increased incidence of 
chronic illness, combined with advances in diagnostic and therapeutic technology have caused 
an increase in the demand for inpatient beds. However, bed numbers per capita decreased by 
18% between 1995–96 and 2005–06 after larger per capita reductions in the previous 20 years67. 
In 2007–08, Australia had 2.5 public hospital beds per 1000 weighted population, and over 7.1 
million visits to EDs68. Figure 3 shows the stability in hospital bed numbers compared with the 
increase in ED presentations69.
Figure 2  Australian trends in ED utilisation and bed availability (2002–07)69
An ageing population with higher expectations, and overstretched community health care options, 
compound this problem70.
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The use of EDs as GP services contributes to overcrowding of ED waiting rooms. In normal times, 
patients who use EDs as GP services have a relatively low level of impact on how the ED functions 
because they pass through the department proper quickly67. However, in a pandemic situation, 
waiting room overcrowding poses a significant public health risk. Patients with a potentially 
highly infectious illness may cross-infect other patients or visitors, as happened during the SARS 
outbreak in Canada in 200371. 
Seasonally, influenza has been recognised to put pressure on EDs in winter through increased 
numbers of presentations25. Canadian studies conclude that this surge is generally associated with 
people over the age of 65 with pre-existing medical conditions72. In a pandemic situation, extra 
presentations may come from all age groups.
The role of EDs in disaster and pandemic response
Whilst vaccination is vital to stop the spread of pandemic influenza, vaccine development takes 
time. Community mitigation strategies such as social distancing, cough and sneeze etiquette, and 
frequent thorough hand washing are needed to reduce the spread of disease as much as possible in 
the interim25.
Stockpiling resources and equipment is a necessary part of disaster preparedness. Before the 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, the Australian Government stockpiled antiviral agents, 
ventilators, and PPE. However, the distribution and dispersal of stockpiled resources during 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza became an issue73. In Canada and the USA, it was reported that 
stockpiled ventilators were too old or too simple to cope with the complex ventilation strategies 
required in severe Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza infection, with ECMO needed rather than 
normal ventilators74, 75.
There is contradictory information in pandemic plans devised for different sections of the health 
care system. For example a 2003 survey, undertaken on behalf of the Australian and New Zealand 
Intensive Care Society, identified hospital EDs as additional short-term bed spaces for ventilated 
patients in the event of a pandemic8. This ignores the issue that, during a pandemic, EDs have 
increased demand on their space and resources and cannot be expected to also function as satellite 
ICUs.
In the early weeks of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, the AHMPPI was criticised as suffering 
from too little clinician input, for having a rigid adherence to worst case scenario planning 
assumptions, and having a heavy focus on data management and information flow, rather than 
patient management. Slow distribution of PPE and antiviral medications from the national 
stockpile was also criticised73.
During the Toronto experience of SARS, where one patient infected many others in an ED, 
rigorous infection control was applied to everyone entering hospitals. In one hospital an outdoor 
screening area was erected, with potentially infected patients transferred directly from this area 
to isolation facilities. At another Toronto hospital, anyone with the potential to be infected was 
masked and immediately moved to a negative pressure room, regardless of their presenting 
complaint. Other measures employed in Toronto hospitals to prevent spread of the disease 
included rigorous cleaning and isolation principles, procedure and protocol lists for the use of 
PPE, closure of some hospital entrance points with guards at available entrances to exclude or 
control access to ED, exclusion of all non-essential personnel from the hospital, protocols to 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
12
govern patient movements, alteration in ventilation to create negative pressure rooms, and the 
removal of all hallway stretchers. Staff updates were provided daily via bulletin boards and email. 
Extra housekeeping and transport staff were employed within hospitals71, 76.
During the peak of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza epidemic, the Texas Children’s Hospital 
in Houston implemented a mobile paediatric emergency response team (MPERT). The MPERT 
was previously used successfully in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The MPERT was 
set up in a covered, open-air car park close to the ED, and all patients were triaged before entry 
to the hospital. Point-of-care influenza test kits were used initially, but the supply quickly ran 
out. Patients assessed as being probably infected with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza were 
isolated, evaluated, treated, and discharged without entering the hospital unless their condition 
was assessed as needing emergency care or admission. Social distancing for staff was performed 
through infection control techniques including symptom screening, isolation, contact precautions, 
and the use of N95 respirators. Streamlining processes including paperwork, simultaneous nursing 
and medical assessment, and a designated discharge nurse educator facilitated dealing with this 
large influx of patients to an already stressed system. Current, multilingual advice was placed on 
the hospital website, and both nursing staff and automated phone lines were available to answer 
frequently asked questions. Printed advice was issued to parents on discharge77.
The Joe DiMaggio Children’s Hospital in Florida reported setting up an initial triage point outside 
the entrance to the paediatric ED, and high-risk patients were directed for further triage in the 
ambulance bay. Keeping patients cool, comfortable, hydrated, and fed in this environment proved 
to be challenging, and patient satisfaction dropped significantly during this time. However, 
no staff members tested positive for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza and no cases of cross-
infection were reported whilst this system was in operation. Stores of PPE and testing swabs 
were quickly depleted. Extra costs of more than US$3000 per day were incurred for extra staffing 
and equipment. Communication to the media and community was handled by administrative 
staff. Daily briefings were held for staff, but there was some confusion about the collection and 
processing of specimens despite attempts to provide a clear, consistent message78.
A trial conducted at Stanford University Hospital after the initial epidemic used volunteers acting 
as patients with de-identified real patient data to run a simulation trial in a covered car park near 
the hospital. The results indicated that off-site assessment areas may be a feasible method of rapid 
assessment that limits waiting times, frees space in EDs for more critically ill patients, and provides 
social distancing of potentially infectious patients to reduce the risk of cross-infection79.
Another method of social distancing is to triage patients over the phone. However, misdiagnoses 
of serious illnesses were reported in the UK where staff in call centres, with no medical training, 
used an algorithm to diagnose and recommend treatment for people concerned that they had 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza80–82. Wales opted out of this system for pandemic management 
from the beginning, as it was felt patients should be seen by clinicians83.
In disaster management, there is a risk that patients from the disaster effectively become treated as 
‘Very Important Persons’ (VIPs) and receive a priority disproportionate to their clinical urgency 
or severity. The real risk is that seriously ill patients who are not from the ‘event’ may receive a 
lesser priority than those from the ‘event’ who are, in reality, less ill. Rapid development of clinical 
guidelines is needed to standardise the care of all patients and minimise the impact of pandemic 
events on other patients within the emergency health care system. The development of clinical 
guidelines is dependent on shared experiences and common learning from clinical exposure.
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Impact of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza on Emergency 
Departments
Published figures from Australian health departments show a surge in ED presentations during 
the 2009 influenza season, although the timing of the increased presentations varied from state 
to state24. As it is already known that there are crowding problems in Australian EDs, it is logical 
to assume that the crowding problem was exacerbated by the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. 
Internationally, EDs reported similar experiences37. In New York City, peak increases in ED 
presentations occurred on the days following the first reports of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza 
in New York City, and subsequently after the report of first death in New York City84. In Australia, 
GPs in Victoria reported coming under increased pressure from high patient numbers, inconsistent 
implementation of the AHMPPI, failures in the supply of PPE and antivirals from the national 
stockpile, time-consuming reporting requirements, delays in receiving influenza test results, delays 
in gaining permission to supply oseltamivir to patients, and poor communication of policy changes 
as the outbreak progressed85. Victoria also experienced a 30% increase in ED demand during 
the CONTAIN Phase of (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic44. A report in the Australian Nursing 
Journal also claims record numbers of ED presentations in Canberra during June 200984. These 
figures, coupled with a 16% increase in absenteeism over the previous year, caused stress within 
ACT Health. The higher absenteeism rate was believed to be caused by a combination of winter 
seasonal influences, school holidays, staff illness, and illness in families of staff. However, the 
report also states that two nurse-led flu clinics functioned successfully throughout the pandemic 
outbreak, taking a load off EDs and GPs84.
The 2003 experience of SARS in Toronto highlighted how changed operational practices 
necessitated by an infectious disease outbreak can add to the burden of work within the ED. 
Many of these changes added to an already overburdened system. The need to screen and redirect 
patients who present to the ED added to the triage time by requiring additional processes. Patient 
education for suspected cases to follow the masking and isolation protocols whilst within the 
ED was also time-consuming. Physical space limitations in EDs mean that patient throughput 
is constrained by how many patients can be seen in the available area. Alternatives to the use 
of nebulised medications and non-invasive assisted ventilation had to be found to prevent the 
potential airborne spread of disease76. Many of these challenges were replicated in the experience 
with the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic. Extra pathology testing was required with suspected 
cases of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza requiring nasopharangeal swabs. At the peak of the 
epidemic, laboratory testing was taking three to five days, by which time the optimal time for 
prescription of antivirals had passed. Whilst many EDs used rapid antigen point-of-care testing, 
these tests have been shown to have limited accuracy for known Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, 
with rates of detection reportedly as low as 11.1%87.
Guidelines for the administration of oseltamivir recommend administration within 48 hours 
of onset of the disease. The time lag in getting pathology results meant oseltamivir had to be 
administered before pathology results were available to achieve optimal effects. Adherence to this 
guideline would have seen many patients treated with antiviral medication for a disease they did 
not have73. There is currently a great deal of debate about the efficacy of oseltamivir. The latest 
Cochrane Review concluded that, in healthy adults, oseltamivir only shortens the duration of 
symptoms by 24 hours if given within 48 hours of the onset of the disease. There is insufficient 
evidence of its effectiveness in preventing complications, and so it should not be given routinely 
for seasonal influenza88–90. There is concern that, given the general mildness of Pandemic 
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(H1N1) 2009 Influenza, oseltamivir has been overprescribed, and that an increase in resistance 
may occur as a result73. It is well known that it is difficult to clinically differentiate patients 
with influenza from those with other viral respiratory infections38. There are unnecessary risks 
attached to receiving treatment for a disease that the patient may not have. The side-effect profile 
of oseltamivir includes, most commonly, gastrointestinal symptoms and headaches but, in rare 
cases, delirium and psychosis (most frequently in children and adolescents), raised liver enzymes, 
and allergic reactions91. However, the information available at the time of the Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Influenza outbreak, the divergence of medical opinion, and the changing nature of the advice 
needs to be considered in any debates about these concerns.
In the USA, it was reported that increased biosurveillance reporting requirements and increased 
workload during the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak led to poor levels of reporting 
compliance in hospitals without automated reporting systems, compared with full compliance 
from hospitals with automated reporting systems85.
ED staff reported discomfort as a result of working with barrier methods of protection for 
frontline health care workers. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Guidelines 
assume Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza infection occurs via droplet, contact, and small aerosol 
transmission. Recommendations for PPE for frontline workers are based on these assumptions. 
PPE for health care workers in close contact with a suspected influenza patient during the (H1N1) 
2009 influenza pandemic consisted of protective eyewear, an impervious gown or apron, gloves, 
and a fluid-repellent surgical mask. During aerosol generating procedures, P2 (N95) particulate 
filter masks, protective eyewear, and disposable impervious gowns and gloves were required49. 
PPE and other barrier methods are vital to ED staff who cannot be protected in any other way 
before an effective vaccine is developed. Many staff reported poor compliance with donning and 
removing PPE due to time constrains and discomfort, especially when the wearing of gloves, 
gowns, eye protection, and masks were required for prolonged periods37, 92, 93.
The CDC recommends the use of respiratory protection, at least equivalent to N95 masks13 for 
health care workers managing patients with ILI. However, Canadian research has found that 
for influenza, N95 masks are no more protective than normal surgical masks94. Users often find 
N95 masks uncomfortable, with somatic complaints including breathing difficulties, itching, 
rashes, and acne having been reported. Some users have found the masks cause difficulties with 
communication and establishing a therapeutic relationship with patients76, 92, 95, 96. Inconsistencies 
in recommendations between authorities need to be resolved to improve staff compliance37. There 
is consensus that particulate respirators, eye protection, and impervious gowns and gloves should 
be used for all aerosol-generating procedures, and that these procedures should be undertaken in 
a negative pressure room, if one is available38, 97, 98. Where tolerated, masking patients is probably 
more effective than masking health care workers99.
There have been reports of hospitals having experienced problems obtaining sufficient supplies 
of PPE and antivirals during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic37. In the USA, hospitals 
experienced storage problems for PPE and antivirals once dispensed from the national 
stockpile100.
Hand hygiene amongst the general public entering one New Zealand hospital after the start of 
the pandemic was noted to be poor, despite media campaigns, extensive signage at the hospital 
entrance, and obvious provision of alcohol gel. It was reported that only 18% used the alcohol gel; 
more people used it going into the hospital than leaving the hospital101.
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Rapidly changing guidelines created confusion for the use of PPE and other issues. Participants 
in a Californian workshop in September 2009 voiced frustration over rapidly changing guidelines 
that were not dated or timed, making it difficult to rapidly determine pertinent changes. Workshop 
participants also found disparities between guidance from different sources, leading to a call for a 
common credible source of information100.
Staffing issues
There are a number of issues that impact ED staffing during a pandemic. A key concern during 
the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic was whether health care workers would come to work in 
the face of an illness of unknown severity or contagion. A survey conducted in the UK before 
this pandemic indicated a potential staff absenteeism rate of up to 85% during an influenza 
pandemic102, whilst an Australian study predicted absenteeism rates of between 17% and 53%, 
depending on a variety of factors. However, staff in ED and acute medical wards expressed more 
willingness to present for work than those working in areas in which they were less likely to be 
exposed103. In another UK survey, staff expressed a strong sense of duty to both patients and 
colleagues and intended to come to work regardless of the severity of the illness, unless their 
family, particularly children, needed them at home; if they were too ill to work themselves; or 
they had no means of getting to work if the pandemic disrupted transport104. During pandemic 
situations, hospital management should provide timely education and support, pre-training, 
evidence that staff are valued, and support for staff working outside their usual sphere of 
expertise105. In the UK, the nurse registering body refused to indemnify nurses who worked 
outside their usual field of practice during the pandemic106.
In an Australian survey of ED nurses107, most participants gave positive responses about their 
willingness to participate in a biological incident; however, there was a significant decrease in 
reported comfort levels in dealing with unknown biological agents. This survey showed that 
over 70% of nurses surveyed reported undertaking CBR training; however, the average time to 
last training was 19.2 months (SD=12)107. A survey of members of the Australasian College for 
Emergency Medicine in 2003 reported similar findings, with 91% of respondents stating their 
hospital had evaluated their major incident plan within the preceding two years. However, only 
21% reported they felt their ED would cope well or very well with a biological incident, and 38% 
reported feeling that their ED would not cope at all108.
How far does a health care worker’s duty of care to patients go? How far does the hospital’s duty 
of care to its staff extend? What should be done about staff with health conditions that place them 
at a higher risk of infection? What is the impact on workers’ families, and their responsibilities 
outside the workplace? Should health care workers be forced to be immunised? Will workers 
comply with quarantine recommendations or take antiviral medications if exposed to the disease?
The experience of SARS gives potential insights into how health care workers may behave during 
a pandemic. Thirty per cent of SARS cases were health care workers, some of whom died of the 
infection. Whilst many workers performed with commendable dedication, there were reports 
of workers who refused to work with SARS patients, or who refused to work at all. Some left 
health care work voluntarily, and some were dismissed by their employers. Shortly after the SARS 
experience,  professional codes of ethics came under examination, particularly in Canada, as these 
are useful tools for establishing both workers’ rights and responsibilities, and their ethical duties 
and obligations109, 110. At the time there were mixed views about the degree of duty of care that 
exists during outbreaks of infectious disease. Working groups could not reach consensus on the 
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degree to which health care workers owe a duty of care when their own lives, and those of their 
family and friends, are at risk in the course of patient care109, 110.
Whilst there has been a great deal made of an expectation of staff absenteeism during a pandemic, 
it is known that staff worldwide often come to work even when ill. In the tropics, influenza is 
under-recognised and under-diagnosed, which can lead to staff infecting their families, colleagues, 
and patients inadvertently111. In Scotland, a 1996 study showed that whilst 23% of staff in the 
study had serological evidence of influenza infection, there was only an 8% absenteeism rate in 
the same influenza season112. A 2007 Australian study found that 24% of medical staff and 26% of 
ancillary staff would present to work in spite of being symptomatic for pandemic influenza if there 
was a staff shortage113. This survey also found that whilst most staff would adhere to quarantine 
and antiviral medication directives, a large proportion would be very unhappy to do so, which 
could impair their adherence to these measures113. A recent Australian study reports that over one 
quarter of the health and community service workers surveyed would ignore a directive to remain 
away from work if they were diagnosed with seasonal influenza114. Fewer than half the emergency 
nurses in another Australian study felt adequately prepared for biological incidents; however, there 
was still a high degree of willingness to participate in these types of incidents: 52.9% (n = 27) 
willing to participate in a biological incident reported neutral or negative responses to adequacy 
of training107. A single hospital study in the USA undertaken after the peak of the (H1N1) 2009 
influenza pandemic found that health care worker infection was highest in the adult ED, followed 
by the paediatric ED. It is a matter of concern that there was not a commensurate increase in sick 
leave in these departments, leading to the conclusion that some health care workers may have 
continued to work in spite of being infected with the virus115. Amongst health care workers it is 
known that there is a conflict between self-protection and duty of care. It has been recognised that 
some will work themselves to exhaustion in a crisis until ‘given permission’ to slow down105.
Recommendations from the WHO and the CDC were to redeploy staff with risk factors for 
severe Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza infection, which caused depletion in the ED workforce. 
However, not all authorities agreed with the WHO98 and CDC97 guidelines regarding staff 
redeployment. A joint paper published by the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 
(SHEA), the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc. (APIC), 
the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), and the American College of Occupational 
and Environmental Medicine (ACOEM) felt that this approach was neither feasible nor desirable. 
The paper stated redeploying staff would not only erode confidence in the efficacy of PPE and 
infection control guidelines, but would invade the privacy of staff who may not wish to divulge risk 
factors to their employers. They also cited subjectivity about risk factors such as obesity and severe 
asthma116. However, it would seem irresponsible for any hospital to expect people with known risk 
factors to expose themselves to an infection which poses greater risk to them than it does to others. 
Given that hospitals owe a duty of care to their employees, it would also potentially open the door 
to litigation should they become ill.
Staffing problems occur due to the large influx of patients, staff illness, and family obligations56. A 
Western Australian survey of parents whose children were in schools that were closed during the 
pandemic revealed that 45% of these parents took 1–5 days off to care for asymptomatic children, 
whilst 74% of these students participated in out-of-home activities including sporting events, 
shopping, outdoor recreation, and parties during the time their schools were closed. This leads to 
the question of how efficacious school closure is as a strategy to prevent the spread of infection117.
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Immunisation
Traditionally, hospital staff demonstrate a poor level of uptake of seasonal influenza immunisation. 
Rates have been reported as being between 20% and 50% across Australia118. Various reasons cited 
for this include a lack of perception of personal risk, poor knowledge levels of how immunisation 
works, doubts about vaccine efficacy or safety, self-perceived contraindications, and inconvenient 
access119. A study in Hong Kong conducted before and repeated after the Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Influenza outbreak reported no significant increase in intention to receive immunisation 
against the virus when it was released, with participants citing fears of side effects and doubt of 
efficacy as their main reasons for refusing. This result is in spite of the Hong Kong experience 
of SARS, which was expected to increase health care workers’ acceptance of vaccination120. 
There has been a widespread perception in 2009 that the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza 
vaccine has been ‘rushed’ into production and not comprehensively tested121. When the current 
vaccine was released in Australia, multi-dose vials posed a problem, with insurance companies 
initially refusing to cover GPs who administered it122. The potential use of multi-dose vials for 
mass immunisation campaigns has been part of Australia’s pandemic plan for several years, and 
the known risks associated with their use can be minimised by providing clear guidelines and 
appropriate and timely education on their use123. Anecdotal feedback from individuals seeking 
vaccination evidenced reluctance by some GPs to ‘open a vial’ for just one person, thus impeding 
the vaccination program.
In Canada, there has been a proposal to extend pharmacists’ scope of practice to include 
administering influenza vaccine to reach more people124, whilst in the UK guidelines for the 
administration of vaccines by health care assistants have been developed125.
Summary
International experience with influenza pandemics confirms the potential of pandemics to cause 
a significant increase in the annual burden of disease. Influenza pandemics have significant 
consequences for health systems and hospital EDs, which are the hub of the health systems’ 
required response. What is not known is the extent and the nature of these effects on EDs and 
their staff. Also unknown are the strategies that are most effective in minimising impacts and 
maximising the capacity of EDs to promote the health and wellbeing of the community. Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza provided the opportunity to describe in some detail the burden carried by 
EDs in these circumstances.
3. Research question, aim, objectives, and 
methods
EDs play a significant role in the response to pandemics. However, the exact nature of this role and 
the effects pandemics have on EDs is unclear. The (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic presented an 
opportunity to examine these effects in detail to better understand and inform the role EDs may 
play in future pandemic management.
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The aim of this study is to describe the impact and clinical profile (including severity) of patients 
presenting to EDs with ILI throughout Australia during the recent Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza outbreak to inform future policy, planning, and response management.
The objectives of this study include:
 » to describe the number and clinical profile of patients who presented to EDs throughout 
Australia with ILI over the period April–August 2009, and their health outcomes
 » to describe the management of patients presenting with ILI in EDs throughout Australia
 » to qualitatively describe the impact of the outbreak on EDs in terms of special precautions 
required, changes to operational practices, staff support and protection, and the impact of 
staff absenteeism
 » to use this information to review current standards and guidelines for pandemic management 
in EDs throughout Australia and inform preparations for the forthcoming northern winter 
and future events in Australia.
Project governance
This project was managed under the auspices of the Queensland University of Technology 
(QUT). The Principal Investigator, Chief Investigators, and Partner Investigators, together with 
the research staff, constituted the Research Team that was responsible for the detailed design of 
the research plan and the research instruments for monitoring how the research was conducted 
and informing the final analysis and outcomes.
A virtual Reference Group of relevant experts assisted with considering the data and findings and 
helped to interpret these and design the policy outcomes.
Project overview
The study was conducted in three phases.
Phase 1—Initiation (months 1 and 2)
Phase 1 of the project involved identifying, collecting, and collating existing published material 
from a variety of sources. Articles of relevance were identified from a search of documents using 
Google Scholar, and a PubMed search using the MeSH terms ‘SARS’, ‘immunisation’, ‘H1N1’, 
‘swine flu’, ‘pandemic’, ‘influenza’, ‘emergency AND department’ and ‘surge capacity’. Only papers 
written in English were included. Bibliographies of selected peer reviewed articles were manually 
searched and articles of interest retrieved and reviewed. RSS feeds from the USA CDC and WHO 
were checked daily. Other sources included government websites from Australia and overseas.
Phase 2—Data collection (months 3 and 4)
Phase 2 involved surveying ED personnel around Australia using the mailing lists of the ACEM, 
the ACEN, and the CENA. Each of these institutes emailed a preliminary alert to members 
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advising them of the nature of the study and seeking their support. An email was then forwarded 
to each member inviting them to complete an online survey implemented with Survey Monkey™. 
Reminder emails were forwarded on two occasions. Individual follow up was attempted for the 
Directors of Emergency Medicine following a disappointing response to the emails.
These surveys sought data in five broad domains:
 » quantification of the workload of EDs over the period of the pandemic to identify the total 
impact of the pandemic and to identify the particular impact of patients presenting with ILI
 » identification of the severity profile of patients with ILI and their outcomes in terms of 
hospital admission and therapy required
 » description of the policies and procedures adopted by the EDs towards the management of 
patients with ILI within the department, and the protection of staff and other patients
 » qualification of the response to, and the impact of, the pandemic on the operations of the ED, 
staff availability and support
 » qualification of the effects of the pandemic on staff personally.
Phase 3—Data analysis and reporting (months 5 and 6)
Phase 3 involved the collation, analysis, and interpretation of data and the production of relevant 
reports.
Answers to survey questions were transferred from Survey Monkey™ to PASW 17 (formerly 
known as SPSS) software for analysis. Data were checked for internal consistency and appropriate 
values. A few surveys were removed from the analysis because either too few questions were 
answered or answers were inconsistent. In a small number of cases, answers to individual questions 
were re-coded or removed as appropriate. 
Descriptive statistics (frequencies, means, and medians) were calculated for all closed-ended 
questions. In addition, chi-square tests (for frequency comparisons) and analysis of variance tests 
(for mean comparisons) were conducted for most questions to identify differences by professional 
group—nurses, senior medical officers, ACEM Fellows, and registrars or trainee emergency 
doctors. Significance levels for these tests are presented.
Ethics review
The study was conducted under the review of the QUT Ethics Committee (Approval attached), 
Ethics Number: 0900000807.
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4. Findings
Overview of state data
Introduction
All state and territory health departments were contacted to obtain data on ILI and Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza presentations to emergency departments during the (H1N1) 2009 
influenza pandemic, compared with previous years. Three states (Qld, Vic, and WA) provided 
some data to the research team. Information for four of the remaining states and territories (NSW, 
NT, SA, and Tas) was obtained from online reports. No data were available for ACT. Because the 
specifics of the available data were varied, and the time periods the data covered also varied, the 
analyses are presented separately by state, with specific topical discussions and general conclusions 
following.
New South Wales
The impact of the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza virus on EDs in New South Wales was 
significant, especially during the month of July. Data presented in the NSW Health report126 
came from 52 EDs statewide. Total ED presentations were higher in 2009 compared with 
2008 for the period from late June through to late July, with the peak being about 25% higher 
(roughly 40,000 in 2009 versus 32,000 in 2008). The most dramatic difference in 2009 was for 
weekly presentations to EDs for ILIs, as shown in Figure 3 copied from the report126. These data 
demonstrate an earlier, and more severe, impact of influenza on EDs during 2009 than in the 
previous five winters. The 2009 peak in mid-July of around 1300 weekly ILI presentations to EDs 
was approximately three times higher than any peak occurring in previous years, where the peaks 
were usually in August.
Figure 3  Comparison of weekly influenza-like illness presentations to NSW emergency 
departments, 2003–2009
Source:  Population Health NSW. Influenza report for the month of September, 2009126. 
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Northern Territory
In the Northern Territory, Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza affected EDs from mid-June 
through to late August, with the peaks at most hospitals occurring in July. In EDs, the rate of ILI 
presentations was particularly high in July, reaching approximately 100 per 1000 consultations in 
mid-July127. ‘The epidemiology of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza in the Northern Territory, 
June–September 2009’ report does not give analogous figures for previous years, but does describe 
the rate of infection and hospitalisation due to the pandemic as worse than that occurring in other 
states. The epidemic had a disproportionate impact on the Indigenous population in the NT, with 
‘Aboriginal Territorians 5.4 times more likely to contract the pandemic influenza, and 12.2 times 
more likely to be hospitalised than their non-Aboriginal counterparts’127.
Queensland
Queensland provided the number of ILI-specific ED presentations for the period May through 
August for three years: 2007, 2008, and 2009. The figure for 2009 (about 32,800) was 1.9 times 
higher than the average of the previous two years (roughly 17,500), as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4  Number of ILI presentations to EDs for May through August for 2007, 2008, and 
2009 for Queensland
South Australia
South Australia provided the best quality data128, supplying both the number of ILI and total 
number of ED presentations for the months April through September for 2006 through 2009 for 
four EDs in the state. This allowed both the number and proportion of ILI presentations compared 
with the total number of ED presentations for 2009 to be compared with previous years. Figure 5 
shows the number of ILI presentations in the flu season for 2009 compared to the average number 
for years 2006, 2007, and 2008.
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Figure 5  Total number of ILI presentations in 2009 compared with average total number of 
ILI presentation of 2006 through 2008 with 95% confidence intervals for South Australia
The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5 demonstrate that the average number of ILI 
presentations for 2009 was significantly higher in June and July than the corresponding months in 
2006, 2007, and 2008. The large width of the confidence intervals in Figure 5 is more likely to be a 
reflection of the small number of yearly observations provided, rather than a result of instability in 
the estimates of the average number of ILI presentations.
Using the number of ILI presentations is susceptible to changes in population size over the study 
period. Figure 6 shows the proportions of all ED presentations that were ILI.
Figure 6  Proportion of ILI presentations for all ED presentations for 2009 compared with the 
average proportion of ILI presentations for 2006 through 2008
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As in Figure 4, the difference in the ILI presentations, as a proportion of total ED presentations, 
gives a strong indication that the ILI presentations were considerable higher for May, June, and 
July of 2009 compared with previous years. The peak in July (with ILI making up 18.7% of total 
ED presentations) was approximately 2.5 times higher than the peak (in August) of the average of 
the years 2006–2008 (7.6%).
Tasmania
The published information for Tasmania129 also shows that the 2009 influenza season hit earlier 
and harder in 2009 than in previous years. With separate data gathered by hospital, the proportion 
of all ED presentations that displayed ILI symptoms was 1.5–1.9 times higher in 2009 than 
the average over the previous five years (2004–2008). For example, the proportion of all ED 
presentations with ILI symptoms peaked at about 27% in mid-July 2009, compared with a peak of 
14% in mid-August for the average of the earlier years.
Victoria
Victoria also provided the total number of ILI presentations for the months April through 
September for the years 2006 through 2009. However, the total number of ED presentations was 
not provided. Figure 7 shows the number of ILI presentations in 2009 compared with the average 
number of ILI presentations in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The 2009 influenza season occurred earlier 
and was more severe than in the three previous years. In 2009, the number of ILI presentations 
for May, June, and July was significantly higher than the average numbers for the three preceding 
years, with the peak in June 2009 (about 8900) being 1.4 times higher than the peak (August) for 
the average of 2006–2008 (about 6300).
Figure 7  Total number of ILI presentations in 2009 compared with average total number of 
ILI presentation of 2006 through 2008 with 95% confidence intervals for Victoria
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Western Australia
Western Australia provided data on the total number of ED presentations for the winter of 2009 
compared to the previous three years as shown in Figure 8. The number for 2009 (about 197,000) 
was somewhat higher than in the previous years (ranging from 170,000 to 186,000), though it is 
difficult to attribute this specifically to the ILI epidemic with the information available. Western 
Australia also has a rapidly growing population, so some increase in presentations over time is to 
be expected.
Figure 8  Total number of ED presentations for the period May through September for the 
years 2006 through 2009 in Western Australia
The numbers of ILI presentations to EDs were only provided for 2009 (May through September), 
with about 29,400 (14.9% of all ED presentations) displaying ILI symptoms across the state.
Special topics
Queensland and Victoria also provided data on the epidemiology of the ILI presentations to the 
EDs during 2009 and for earlier years. Queensland provided data for the period from May to 
August, whilst Victoria’s data focused on the May to September period.
Amongst the demographic variables, the gender balance for ILI presentations to ED was similar 
in 2009 (around 50% female) to previous years for Victoria (around 49% female). Queensland 
provided data specifically for those diagnosed with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza; however, 
this group is only about 17% of the total ILI presentations to EDs in 2009. The percentage of 
females in the group specific to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza was higher, at 55%, but this 
could have been due to differential testing by gender.
In terms of distribution by age group, the 2009 influenza season was clearly different from 
preceding years. The data shown for Victoria in Figure 9 demonstrates that the percentage of 
ILI presentations to EDs was higher in 2009 than in previous years, especially for the 10–19 and 
20–29 age groups and somewhat higher for the three age groups covering 30 to 59.  Conversely, 
relatively fewer very young people (age 0–9) and older people (60 or over) presented to EDs 
with ILI during 2009. In Queensland, there was a very large drop in the percentage of ILI 
presentations to EDs amongst 0–4 year olds in 2009 compared with earlier years, and increases in 
the percentages in all of the five year age groups from ages 10 to 34. This differential age pattern for 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza is consistent with the literature from other countries. 
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Figure 9  Percentage of all ILI presentations to ED by 10-year age group for Victoria, May 
through September, 2006–2009
In terms of the severity of ILI cases presenting to EDs, the data for Victoria and Queensland do 
not show glaring differences between 2009 and the earlier years. However, the data for the lowest 
acuity triage category for Victoria shown in Figure 10 demonstrate a trend by month. In May and 
June, a higher percentage of all ILI presentations in 2009 were lowest acuity compared with the 
average of the three previous years (2006–2008). Then, for the later months, the 2009 figure is 
close to, or below, those for the previous years.
Figure 10  Percentage of ILI presentations to ED in the lowest acuity triage category, May 
through September 2009 and average of 2006–2008 for Victoria
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In Queensland, the percentage of ILI presentations to EDs in 2009 that were admitted to hospital 
was slightly higher (6%) than in the previous two years (5%) for the May through August period 
in Queensland as shown in Figure 11. The percentage admitted to hospital was much higher for 
those officially diagnosed with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza (9%).
Figure 11  Percentage of ILI presentations to ED admitted to hospital, May through August 
by year for Queensland
Conclusions
The data compiled from seven Australian states and territories point to some general conclusions:
 » The 2009 influenza season occurred earlier than was typical in previous years. The peak 
varied across states, hitting hardest in June in Victoria, and hardest in July in all other states 
where monthly figures are available.
 » The 2009 influenza season was more severe in terms of numbers than was typical in 
previous years. Using either total number of ILI presentations to EDs or the proportion 
of ILIs to total ED presentations, the ratio of 2009 to immediately previous years ranged 
from 1.4 at the peak in Victoria, through 1.5–1.9 at the peak for Tasmania, 1.9 at the peak in 
Queensland, and 2.5 at peak in South Australia, to about 3.0 at the peak in New South Wales.
 » The 2009 influenza season was not remarkable in terms of gender balance.
 » The 2009 influenza season showed a different age distribution of ED presentations 
from previous years. Relatively more ILI presentations to EDs were in their teens, 20s and 
30s in 2009 compared to earlier years.
 » Early in the course of the 2009 influenza season, there may have been relatively more 
lowest acuity ED presentations of ILIs than in previous years. Data from Victoria showed 
2007 2009 H1N1 2009 total ILI2008
0%
1%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
Year
%
 o
f E
D
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
ns
 a
dm
it
te
d 
to
 h
os
pi
ta
l
2% 5%
5%
9%
6%
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
27
a higher percentage of ILI presentations to EDs falling into the lowest acuity triage category 
than for earlier years.
 » Some weak evidence suggests that more ILI presentations to EDs were admitted to 
hospital in 2009 than in previous years.
General staff survey
Quantitative data results
Response rates
The overall response rate for the general staff survey was 18.4%, with 618 usable responses to 
the 3355 emails sent out by the professional colleges (ACEM, ACEN, and CENA). Where 
emails bounced or were invalid, the respondents were removed from the denominator. Separate 
response rates can be reported for three groups, based on the use of separate email lists: 
ACEM Fellows—19.3% (165 out of 856); Nurses—18.7% (162 out of 1087); and ACEM 
Trainees—17.7% (250 out of 1412).
The quantitative results of the general staff survey are shown in tables in Appendix A.
Demographics of respondents
Responses to the demographic questions are shown in Table A-1. Because these questions were 
asked on the last page of the survey, some respondents (roughly 117 out of 618) did not answer 
any of them, presumably because they exited the survey before reaching this section.
Respondents worked in all eight Australian states and territories, with a distribution approximately 
proportional to population, except that more respondents were from Victoria than New South 
Wales. Four categories of hospital size were represented by the respondents—from under 250 
beds to over 750 beds. Nurse respondents tended to work in smaller hospitals than doctor 
respondents. As expected, given the distribution of the population and hospitals, more than 
three-quarters of respondents (78%) worked in capital cities either in tertiary or ‘other capital city’ 
hospitals, followed by major regional hospitals (18%), with very few respondents working in rural 
or remote EDs. Reflecting the location of EDs, the vast majority of respondents (93%) worked in 
public hospitals, followed by mixed hospitals e.g. private hospital providing some public services 
(4%) and private hospitals (3%).
As shown in Table A-1, approximately two-thirds of respondents were doctors (66%) and one-
third (33%) nurses, as expected given the sizes of the mailing lists used. Overall, the gender 
balance was nearly 50/50, with 48% male and 52% female. Within each discipline, however, the 
balance was skewed—64% male and 36% female for the doctor respondents and 17% male and 
83% female for the nurse respondents. The distribution of respondents by age was as expected, 
with a mean age of 39 and a median age of 38. Registrars were younger (mean=33) than senior 
medical officers (SMOs) (43) and nurses (42). 
In terms of experience, respondents showed a mean number of years since first qualification 
(as doctor or nurse) of 14 years, with a median of 12 years. As expected, registrars showed a 
dramatically lower figure for average years since qualification (mean = 8) than SMOs and nurses 
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(mean for both = 18). In terms of years of experience working specifically in an ED, a similar 
pattern holds with the registrars having the least experience (mean = 4.5 years), compared to 
means of 14 for senior medical officers and 12 for nurses. Overall, the respondents had a mean 
of 10 years of ED experience and a median of 8 years. Full-time work was common amongst 
respondents, with the mean number of hours typically worked per week being 37 (median = 40). 
On average, doctors, especially registrars, worked more hours than nurses.
Amongst the doctors responding to the survey, 54% were registrars whilst 46% were SMOs (also 
known as staff specialists, consultants, or Fellows of the Australasian College for Emergency 
Medicine) as shown in Table A-2. Roughly two out of five SMOs had an administrative role 
within their ED, such as a Director or Associate Director of Emergency Medicine. Three-quarters 
of registrars and 55% the SMOs listed a Bachelor degree as their highest university qualification. 
Amongst SMOs, 19% had a graduate certificate or diploma and 15% had a masters degree. 
By definition, all SMOs (that is, Fellows of ACEM) have completed post-graduate vocational 
specialty training of at least seven years and have been awarded a College diploma or fellowship. 
Amongst nurses surveyed, 42% served at the level of Clinical Nurse (or Clinical Nurse Specialist, 
Clinical Facilitator or  Clinical Nurse Educator). Twenty-two per cent served at the RN level, 
another 20% served at the manager level (Nurse Unit Manager, Nurse Manager, Clinical Nurse 
Consultant or Clinical Nurse Manager), whilst the remaining nurses served as follows: Educator/
Researcher (7%), Nurse Practitioner (7%) and Director or Associate Director of Nursing (2%). 
Of nurse respondents, 54% held a graduate certificate or diploma, 26% a masters degree, and 1% a 
doctorate. The remaining nurses held a bachelor degree (15%) or a hospital-based certificate (4%).
Emergency Department conditions during (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic
When asked whether their ED had been prepared to deal with the (H1N1) 2009 influenza 
pandemic, most respondents (82%) chose points in the middle of the scale (2, 3, and 4 on 
the 5-point scale), yielding a mean of 3.14 (SD = 1.09) as shown in Table A-3. Registrars were 
significantly more positive about the preparedness of their EDs, with a mean response of 3.4, 
compared to 2.9 for SMOs and 3.1 for nurses (p = 0.001).
Respondents felt quite strongly that the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic had a significant impact 
on the demand in their ED, shown in Table A-4. Eighty-eight per cent chose ‘4’ or ‘5’ on the 
5-point scale, gauging extra demand at the peak of the pandemic, resulting in a mean score of 4.37 
(SD = 0.80). Nurses were even more likely to have chosen the top two scores to describe the extra 
demand (92%) compared with doctors (88%). The mean score of 4.5 for nurses was higher than 
that for registrars (4.4) or SMOs (4.3).
Respondents were asked to assess the mix of cases with ILI (or Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza) 
presenting to their ED at the peak of the pandemic as shown in Table A-5. The means of these 
variables decrease from a high of 3.93 for ‘worried well’ people to 1.68 for ‘critically ill’ people, 
indicating that ED staff saw the mix as heavy on low levels of severity. For example, three-quarters 
(74%) of respondents saw the percentage of ‘worried well’ presentations as ‘high’ or ‘very high.’ 
By comparison, 85% of respondents saw the percentage of ‘critically ill’ people to be ‘low’ or ‘very 
low.’
Most ED staff felt that the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic had had a definite impact on the care 
of other non-influenza or non-Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza patients in their ED as shown 
in Table A-6. The majority of respondents (71%) fell into the ‘moderate’ impact (3 or 4 on the 
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5-point scale) range, with another 10% feeling that the pandemic had a severe impact on the care 
of other patients in their ED. Evaluations from registrars, SMOs, and nurses were quite similar for 
this question.
Information received concerning Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza
Several questions on the survey addressed the information that ED staff received about Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza as shown in Table A-7. Respondents were generally positive about the 
information they received. Ninety-two per cent of respondents felt that the information was useful 
to their work at least half the time, 90% found it sufficient in coverage at least half the time, and 
77% found it consistent (vs inconsistent or contradictory) at least half the time. The question with 
the most ‘negative’ responses was about the consistency of the information. Just under a quarter 
(23%) of those surveyed felt that the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza information they received 
was either ‘not at all’ or ‘seldom’ consistent. SMOs did not find the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza information as useful or sufficient in coverage as registrars or nurses. For example, the 
average response to how often it was useful to their work was 3.4 for SMOs, 3.9 for registrars, and 
3.8 for nurses.
Pandemic plans
About two out of five (39%) of respondents reported that they knew that their hospital or ED had 
a written pandemic plan before the onset of the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic as shown in 
Table A-8. In most cases, these plans were part of a hospital plan, but 50 respondents did report 
working in an ED with a stand-alone ED pandemic plan. Notably, a large proportion (43%) 
of respondents did not know whether a plan existed for their department or hospital. These 
responses differed strongly by discipline, with more than three-fifths of registrars (62%) falling 
into the ‘don’t know’ category, compared to only 33% of SMOs, and 34% of nurses.
Of those reporting the existence of a pandemic plan, two-thirds (66%) knew that it had been 
activated during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic, and 19% knew it had not been activated. 
The remaining 15% did not know the status of the pandemic plan activation in their department. 
Of those reporting an activated plan, the overwhelming majority (98%) stated that it had been at 
least somewhat useful in dealing with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. The overall mean score 
was 3.6 on the 5-point scale ranging from ‘not at all useful’ to ‘very useful.’  Again, registrars were 
more likely to report not knowing whether the pandemic plan had been activated.
Impact on Emergency Department staff
Stress
In comparing their stress levels at work during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic with normal 
stress levels during a similar time of year, nearly all (94%) revealed some increase in stress as 
shown in Table A-9.  More than half (52%) of respondents ranked their increased stress as ‘4’ or ‘5’ 
on a 5-point scale (mean = 3.41, SD = 1.13). ED staff rated a long list of factors by how significant 
they were to their stress level during the pandemic. The factors ranking highest in significance 
(as defined by their mean score) were: lack of space for patients in the ED (4.2), increased 
demand (4.0), access block (to non-ICU hospital wards) (3.7), filling staff deficits (3.3), and staff 
absenteeism (3.3). Concern about becoming ill (2.62) or exposing family members to Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza (2.84) were both less significant than expected.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
30
One of the most interesting features of the stress analysis was the striking difference between 
doctors and nurses in their responses. Nurses displayed significantly more increased stress overall 
(mean = 3.7) than registrars (3.2) or SMOs (3.3, p = .002). For all factors influencing stress with 
significant differences in the mean scores (seven out of 16) between disciplines, it was nurses who 
reported more significant stress stemming from the factor. The most notable of these, in terms 
of absolute differences in the mean scores, were ‘falling below minimum skill mix requirements’ 
(nurses = 3.2, registrars = 2.5 and SMOs = 2.6) and ‘lack of supplies and equipment’ (nurses = 
3.3, registrars = 2.8 and SMOs = 2.7). The factor ‘patient and family aggression’ was particularly 
significant to nurses’ stress (mean = 3.2), fairly significant to registrars’ stress (2.8), and less 
significant to SMOs’ stress levels (2.4).
Preventive measures
ED staff reported on whether various preventive measures to protect staff from infection were used 
in their ED during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic as shown in Table A-10. Use of alcohol-
based hand rubs was universal (98%). The use of surgical masks (87%) and N95 or P2 respirators 
(82%) was also quite high. Antiviral use was inconsistent, with only 36% of staff reporting it as a 
preventive measure in their ED. Reported usage rates were similar between doctors and nurses, 
with the only exception being for N95 or P2 respirators, where registrars were more likely to 
report not knowing whether they had been used (13%) compared with SMOs and nurses (1–2%). 
ED staff were generally quite pleased with the ease of use of these preventive measures. Hand rubs 
(97%) and surgical masks (88%) were rated the easiest to use. About two-thirds of respondents 
found respirators and antivirals easy or very easy to use. Generally, SMOs found surgical masks 
and N95 or P2 respirators more difficult to use than did nurses or registrars.
Support received from others in work role
Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1–5 how supportive various groups and institutions 
were of their needs and concerns during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic as shown in 
Table A-11. ED staff found most groups were supportive; however, some groups were rated 
more highly than others. In order of decreasing mean scores, the groups were ranked as follows: 
ED colleagues (4.3), ED administration (3.9), hospital occupational health department (3.2), 
hospital administration (3.1), professional college (3.0), state health department (2.9), and union 
(2.5). For some of these groups, a fair number of respondents chose ‘not applicable’ or ‘can’t rate,’ 
presumably because that group was not relevant to them; for example they were not a member or 
had no interactions with them.
Responses were similar by professional group for the support from ED administration, hospital 
administration, and unions. Registrars found their ED colleagues less supportive than SMOs 
and nurses found their colleagues. On the other hand, registrars found their professional college, 
ACEM, more supportive (mean = 3.2) than did SMOs (2.8) or nurses (2.9). SMOs were unhappy 
with their hospitals’ occupational health support (2.8), and particularly unhappy with the support 
provided by their state health department (2.4). The mean scores were significantly higher for 
nurses (3.3 for staff health and 3.0 for state health department) and registrars (3.4 for staff health 
and 3.2 for state health department).
Own and other’s illness during pandemic
More than one-third (37%) of respondents became ill with an ILI, whether confirmed as 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza or not, during the pandemic, as shown in Table A-12. Of those 
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who became ill, the vast majority (87%) were not tested for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. 
Amongst those tested, half were confirmed to have Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, and half 
were not. Of those who became ill, more than two out of five (43%) reporting missing no days of 
work. The majority of those who did miss work (86%) were away for between one and five days. 
Amongst those missing work, the mean number of days missed was 3.7.
Doctors were significantly more likely to have become ill with an ILI during the pandemic 
than nurses (26%), with registrars having been especially susceptible (45%). Registrars have a 
significantly younger age profile than SMOs or nurses. On the other hand, when they became ill, 
nurses were significantly more likely to have missed some work (79%) than registrars (59%) or 
SMOs (36%). When they did miss work due to their ILI, nurses and SMOs missed more days on 
average than registrars (4.3 days for nurses and 4.7 days for SMOs).
During the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic some ED staff also cared for people with ILIs outside 
of work. Respondents could check more than one category of caring for persons with an ILI. 
Results are summarised in Table A-13. Overall, just over two out of five (41%) cared for someone 
outside of work with ILI; however, most (83%) did not miss any work. Amongst those who did 
miss work, it was for a mean of 2.9 days. Doctors and nurses were similar in their likelihood of 
having cared for someone with ILI outside of work and also in how many days of work (if any) 
they missed doing so.
Other factors causing Emergency Department staff to miss work during pandemic
Respondents were asked about six other possible factors that might have caused them to miss 
work during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic, such as concern about falling ill with Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza themselves, concern about exposing family members to the virus, closure 
of children’s school, being quarantined, extreme stress, or increased workload as shown in Table 
A-14. None of these questions produced an appreciable response; that is, no factor rated more 
than 5% of respondents indicating that it had caused them to miss work during the pandemic. 
Responses were similar for all three professional groups. A few respondents provided additional 
open responses for causes of missed work. These included injury, fatigue, maternity leave, and 
illness other than the flu in themselves or their children.
Redeployment during pandemic
A fairly small number (8%) of ED staff reported having been redeployed from their usual 
workplace during the pandemic due to injury, fatigue, or maternity leave as shown in Table A-15. 
Of these responses, only 15% were redeployed because they displayed a personal risk factor for 
severe illness from Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza , such as pregnancy or a compromised 
immune system. The rest of the respondents were deployed for other operational reasons. Nurses 
were much more likely to have been redeployed (17%) than doctors (registrars = 5% and SMOs = 
3%). Five of the eight registrars who were redeployed reported personal risk factors as the cause.
Vaccination against Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza
As of the time of this survey (29 October – 18 December 2009) just over one-quarter (26%) of 
ED staff reported having already been vaccinated against Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, as 
shown in Table A-16. Respondents who were not already vaccinated were asked if they intended 
to get vaccinated. Of these (n=376), half (49%) responded with either ‘definitely not’ or ‘probably 
not’ and only 30% had either a definite or probable intention to get vaccinated. The remaining 21% 
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were unsure whether they would get vaccinated. A significantly greater proportion of nurses (33%) 
than doctors (23%, p=0.007) had already been vaccinated. However, amongst those who had not 
been vaccinated, fewer nurses (20%) intended to get vaccinated than registrars (33%) or SMOs 
(35%). On the other hand, more nurses (58%) than doctors (46–47%) were definitely or probably 
not going to get vaccinated.
Staff opinions about Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza topics
ED staff were roughly evenly split on whether they considered Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza 
to be a ‘health emergency’, as shown in Table A-17. Forty-four per cent answered ‘yes’ and 43% 
answered ‘no,’ with the remaining 14% being ‘unsure’. The direction of responses about whether 
staff thought that EDs should take responsibility for managing pandemic influenza was clearer, 
with 57% answering no, only 27% answering yes and 16% unsure. Differences between doctors 
and nurses on these two questions were not significant.
Qualitative data analysis methodology
The short answer responses were downloaded from Survey Monkey™ to Excel. Responses were 
not associated with demographic data. Where multiple responses were allowed for a question, 
these responses were combined into one spreadsheet, except for Question 17, which asked 
for responses in order of importance. The spreadsheets were then checked for spelling and 
typographical errors, and USA and Australian spelling was standardised to Australian spelling. 
The Excel spreadsheets were then exported as tab-separated text files, edited to insert blank lines 
between responses, to remove enclosing double quotes and to reduce escaped double quotes (““) 
to unescaped double quotes (“). A second file was created in which the question number from the 
first line of the file was prepended with a trailing space to the beginning of all data lines. The first 
line and its following blank line were then removed.
For example:
Original
---------------------------------
Q06_1
briefs from health department kept well informed
“PPE requirements - local ““code brown/yellow”” supervisor”
folder at triage outlining steps to follow (from Infectious Diseases)
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---------------------------------
File with first set of changes
---------------------------------
Q06_1
briefs from health department kept well informed
PPE requirements - local “code brown/yellow” supervisor
folder at triage outlining steps to follow (from Infectious Diseases)
---------------------------------
File with second set of changes
---------------------------------
Q06_1 briefs from health department kept well informed
Q06_1 PPE requirements - local “code brown/yellow” supervisor
Q06_1 folder at triage outlining steps to follow (from Infectious Diseases)
---------------------------------
Terms were created to rationalise synonyms, contractions, and local terminology variants to 
facilitate text analysis in Leximancer (Version 3.07) © 2009 (See Appendix B).
A sample of the data analysis for Question 6 on the survey is given below.
Following this, the tab separated text files were downloaded into Leximancer, a text analysis 
system that transforms natural language into semantic patterns in an unsupervised manner. It 
does this in two stages, semantic and relational, using a different algorithm for each stage. Firstly, 
episodic co-occurrence is extracted. In this phase a categorical dictionary is learned, and text 
segments are coded. This is followed by the second phase during which relationships between 
entities and concepts are established130.
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Pre-processing options were adjusted. As the survey responses were short and often not full 
sentences, the sentences per block setting was reduced to one, and the prose test threshold was set 
to zero. Folder tags were applied. The terms ‘eg’, ‘re’, and ‘etc’ were added to the pre-set stop list, 
whilst the term ‘well’ was removed. The biogram sensitivity was set at four or five depending on 
the question to pick up commonly paired terms such as ‘access block’ and ‘worried well’. Concept 
seeds were edited to combine terms with their plurals (e.g. ‘area’ and ‘areas’). The number of 
themes to discover was set at different levels in different questions—initially it was left at auto then 
adjusted until a stable randomisation was achieved in the final analysis. Initially, responses were 
analysed one question at a time, then opposite pairs (i.e. positive and negative) were analysed to 
compare responses. Concepts were ranked by frequency of occurrence, and concept maps created 
detailing their relationship with each other. As an example, the analysis of Question 6 on the 
survey follows.
The question asked ‘What specific aspects of the H1N1 information you received over the course 
of the pandemic did you find most useful to your work in the ED? What was the source of that 
information?’
Figure 12 is the concept map that was generated based on participant responses.
Figure 12  Example of concept map generated by responses to general staff survey Question 6
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Colours move from warm to cool over the colour wheel indicating relative frequency of word 
occurrence from most to least frequent. The grey lines indicate relationships between concepts. 
It can be seen from the concept map (Figure 12) that the state health departments were the most 
important source of information, with guidelines and information on risk groups, symptoms, and 
specific treatments being most frequently cited as being useful information.
Ranked concepts give an indication of word counts as shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13  Ranked concepts for responses to general staff survey Question 6
Ranked concepts
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information
patients
swab
updates
guidelines
risk
treatment
hospital
treat
management
infection
email
cases
advise
testing
staff
criteria
symptoms
website
groups
isolation
definition
required
specific
department
informed
informal
Antivirals
Swineflu
Pubhealth
Swab
100%
65%
58%
48%
41%
38%
38%
37%
31%
28%
27%
27%
23%
23%
20%
20%
19%
18%
17%
16%
15%
15%
13%
12%
10%
09%
03%
01%
46%
34%
28%
12%
106
69
62
51
43
40
40
39
33
30
29
29
24
24
21
21
20
19
18
17
16
16
14
13
11
10
3
1
49
36
30
13
Count Relevance
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
36
Qualitative data results
The short-answer questions fell into several categories. Questions 6, 7, and 8 related to the quality 
of information received during the course of the pandemic, the sources of the information, and 
suggestions for preferred sources, and the content and dissemination of information in future 
pandemics. Questions 12, 13 and 14 dealt with current pandemic plans, their usefulness and 
suggestions for the future. Questions 16 and 17 dealt with personal stressors. Question 18 
dealt with how EDs protected their staff from becoming infected with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza virus, and Questions 20 and 21 asked about supportive and unsupportive actions that 
occurred in hospitals and EDs during the pandemic. Those who became infected with the (H1N1) 
2009 virus were asked in Question 25 if there was anything they had wanted from their employer 
during their illness that they had not received. Other reasons for missing work during the 
(H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic were solicited in Question 28, and vaccination coverage and 
intentions in Question 34. Staff  were asked in Question 35 if they felt that Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza infection was a health emergency. In Question 36 they were asked whether they felt 
ED should be responsible for pandemic influenza management, and in Question 37 how ED 
response could be improved in future pandemics. Question 38 gave them the opportunity to add 
any further comments they wished to make.
Information
Most respondents reported problems with receiving an excessive volume of information, the 
timing of that information, confusion within and between sources, the lack of date and time 
on information as it was issued, and confusion over which was most recent, and guidelines that 
were not possible to follow in their own setting. It was suggested that information to clinicians 
be distilled to ‘need to know’ by an authoritative source, with these taking the form of dot 
point documents or easy-to-follow algorithms. The types of information mentioned as most 
useful were guidelines on testing, disease management, infection control practices, and antiviral 
administration. Media coverage was largely viewed as sensationalist and the cause of many 
unnecessary ED presentations. A daily update from an authoritative source in a news timeslot 
was suggested as potentially useful public education. The state health departments, public health 
departments, and individual hospital infection control and infectious diseases departments were 
identified as both a useful and not useful source of information. ED colleagues were generally 
identified as useful.
Recommendations for the future included having clear, concise, up-to-date information on 
websites. Most respondents preferred receiving information from a single authoritative source, 
though that source varied between being the state health department, the Federal DoHA, and 
professional medical or nursing bodies. Respondents wanted to see less sensationalist media 
coverage and improved public education.
Means of receiving information identified by participants included daily emails, hospital notice 
boards, mobile telephone text messages (SMS), and verbal person to person information at 
handovers and education sessions.
Positive quotes
 » ‘State health department guidelines of potential patients, when to test, who to test, how to 
isolate them etc.’
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 » ‘Emails generated by ED staff who summarised management plans.’
 » ‘Specific clinical information e.g. case definition, phone numbers for public health and 
specific indications for treatment.’
Negative quotes
 » ‘Pages of information about the background—just need a flow chart in ED to follow to 
quickly manage patients.’
 » ‘Precautions to take kept changing so frequently it made me lose confidence that state health 
department actually understood the nature of the problem. I would hate to be a health care 
worker during a pandemic of something more life threatening to myself.’
 » ‘Multiple different protocols active at once—public health, state health department, local 
hospital, and local ED—often not dated or signed and conflicting.’ 
 » ‘Unrealistic expectations by infectious diseases management within hospital—i.e. all patients 
admitted with respiratory illness are to be considered swine flu and will require isolation until 
swabs return—EXCEPT THERE WERE NO BED PROVISIONS MADE FOR THIS!’
Recommendations
 » ‘No more frequent than daily updates—provided at shift commencement in the form of a 
brief, clear guidelines on staff and patient protection measures—these seemed to change 
through the duration.’
 » ‘Daily email bulletins sent to ALL clinicians (medical inpatient teams, intensivists, Infectious 
Diseases, GPs as well as Emergency staff) about current risk, and current management 
and screening protocols. Some information available to public, e.g. who will be screened 
currently, who is entitled to public health stockpile antivirals.’
 » ‘Though email is resourceful, I found many colleagues were not paying attention to them 
as there was a half a dozen emails being sent within a day and many of them were deleted 
without notice being taken by many of the nursing staff. Central emails from one source 
would I think be better interpreted and relayed into practice, and more attention would be 
paid by the staff recipients.’
 » ‘Needs to be simple, up on the wall (i.e. not long documents on the computer) and the 
department needs a leader to explain all the details to all members of staff so that consistent 
treatment/management occurs at all levels within the hospital.’
Pandemic plans
The parts of pandemic plans found useful by respondents included the policies, procedures, and 
protocols, which had been set up in advance of the pandemic. These included guidelines for triage, 
isolation, cohorting, proper use of PPE, and other infection control measures. Arrangements for 
obtaining extra staffing and more PPE were also welcomed, as was the provision of separate triage 
and flu clinics. Limitations to pandemic plans included a lack of specificity to individual hospitals, 
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with some hospital designs making them difficult or impossible to implement, particularly with 
respect to the isolation of potentially infectious patients and appropriate patient flow from triage, 
through the department, and home or to wards. Many respondents stated that the plans were 
designed for a far more virulent disease. Plans also did not take pre-existing heavy workloads into 
account.
Suggestions for the future included greater involvement in planning of major stakeholders 
including EDs, GPs, public health, infection control, and pathology clinicians, as well as members 
of the community. Participants recommended implementing procedures to divert patients who 
could more properly be seen by GPs and establishing flu clinics out of EDs. Better stockpiling 
and release of PPE and antivirals was also mentioned, together with separate flu clinics close to 
EDs, with some designated flu hospitals. Respondents felt there should be more preparation and 
practice of any future plans. They also raised issues about creating surge capacity within hospitals, 
particularly by addressing the pre-existing problem of access block, and the necessity of special 
pandemic funding in the event of a pandemic.
Positive quotes
 » ‘Plan notified ALL hospital staff that the whole hospital had to alter its daily workings to deal 
with this flu.’
 » ‘Opening up of a flu clinic to relieve pressure on the ED when presentation of flu-like 
symptoms were increased.’
 » ‘Well posted PPE advice for patients and staff, public awareness of PPE.’
Negative quotes
 » ‘The practical implementation of this plan was difficult; the spectrum of the disease varied 
from mild moderate to severe and all patients would be sent to the clinic despite some being 
clearly very sick, but because they were flagged as ‘ILI’ they were sent to clinic.’
 » ‘The management plan suggested that patients be kept outside, in the ambulance bay, until 
they could be directed into the decontamination room, which also acts as the resuscitation 
relatives’ room.’
 » ‘Not so much the plan, but the layout of the ED did not make looking after multiple patients 
with query swine flu very easy.’
 » ‘ED staff were expected to deal with these patients as well as carry a heavy winter case load.’
Recommendations
 » ‘Plan should aim to redirect clinically well patients to their GPs at, or just after, triage level. 
Obviously a well-designed criteria including important sign and symptoms and risk factors 
would be necessary to achieve this.’
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 » ‘A dedicated team in a tent/marquee set up separate to, but close to, the ED itself to 
specifically deal with the triage of flu-like illness patients and prioritise the critically unwell 
from the concerned well and avoid mixing of flu patients with non-flu patients.’
 » ‘Need a well-developed process for protecting staff—how will specimens be collected and 
are there enough support staff to take the specimens from the isolation area to the PathLab 
without having to remove gowns/masks/goggles every time.’
 » ‘Closer liaison between GPs and EDs in terms of primary response—many instances of GPs 
sending patients to ED, clearly unaware of current treatment guidelines.’
 » ‘Improved communication in media—patients arrived very confused re information 
provided at times as media reported different avenues for presenting—patients were then 
referred to closest ED, many frustrated patients on arrival.’
Staff stress
Respondents identified that they experienced numerous stressors during the pandemic. These 
included catching Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza themselves, having risk factors such as asthma 
or pregnancy, or having someone at home with risk factors. They reported staffing issues including 
losing staff to illness or redeployment, being redeployed themselves, or working for prolonged 
periods in high-exposure areas to protect others from exposure. Some experienced confusion over 
what to do, and observed variable compliance with guidelines or recommendations amongst staff 
and patients. It was found difficult in some EDs to isolate flu patients from other patients. The use 
of PPE created time constraints for already busy staff. PPE was reported as uncomfortable to wear 
over prolonged periods, and there was variable staff compliance with its use. Respondents cited 
existing access block to hospital wards being exacerbated because some wards refused to admit 
potentially infectious patients. They also reported an increase in the administrative and reporting 
burden in relation to statistical reporting and getting permission to use antivirals.
Quotes
 » ‘Unrealistic and unworkable expectations with PPE that caused increased stress for patients 
and their families and greatly increased the time taken to see each patient. It is very hard to 
be reassuring that parents should not worried about their unwell child when you took five 
minutes to suit up before even walking into the room!’
 » ‘Many staff became ill with flu over this time, and stayed ill for several weeks—regardless, 
staff were coming to work, due to staff shortages, increasing stress, and prolonging illnesses 
ED waiting room a nightmare due to influx of potential ‘swine flu’ patients, mixed with other 
ED arrivals. Potentially spreading the virus.’
 » ‘Asked to work in flu clinic, hospital would not consider prophylactic antivirals, concern for 
significant others (who if contracted swine flu would be unable to work—financial issues 
related to this), lack of equipment, lack of time, and the haste and inconsistency in which 
NSW rolled out changes, changing case definitions made staff angry and confused and then 
they did not care!’
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 » ‘Managing the department on shift with ever changing information and lack of cooperation 
and adherence to plans by some medical staff on floor. Different management between 
ambulance staff and ED directives—e.g. use of nebulisers, exposure by ambulance staff.’
 » ‘Patients in isolation areas not under supervision from nursing staff, due to rural ED and no 
extra staff available or provided—concern for these patients.’ 
The five most difficult aspects of dealing with the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic
Respondents were asked to nominate the five most difficult aspects of dealing with the pandemic 
in their workplace. In order of frequency of being mentioned these were:
1. Information—overload, confusing, ever-changing, inaccurate.
2. Greatly increased workload due to high number of presentations (especially ‘worried well’), 
and staff absences.
3. Physical constraints—difficult to maintain isolation, lack of PPE.
4. Access block.
5. Maintaining core business.
Quotes
 » ‘Assimilating the volume of information from state department and getting that information 
out to the staff in a digestible format.’
 » ‘Burden placed on ED revealed how we lack redundancy or the capacity and skill mix to step 
up to such a scenario, we are struggling to stay afloat at the best of times.’
 » ‘Trying to maintain isolation of potential swine flu patients in overcrowded ED.’
 » ‘Access block to hospital ward beds and ICU.’
 » ‘Trying to manage the normal patient load of the ED when every cubicle is filled with a 
suspected swine flu case who can’t be moved to other areas of the ED or hospital.’
Other preventative measures used to protect ED staff
Respondents reported finding gloves, gowns and aprons, eye protection, and masks easy to use, 
but they also found them hot, uncomfortable, and time-consuming. Many places also ran out 
of stock. Some reported using negative pressure rooms, but these were not always available, 
many had inadequate space, and some patients did not comply with directives to stay in them. 
Compliance problems were also reported with patients being asked to wear masks. Cohorting of 
suspected cases was used as was a separate triage. Spacers were used instead of nebulisers.
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Quotes
 » ‘Masks ran out. Swine flu clinic in room requiring double swipe card access. I witnessed 
almost all staff who were wearing protective equipment reach under their gowns to access 
their cards.’
 » ‘After the first 2–3 days of cases pretty much all staff stopped using masks and gowns as flu 
was most often mild and everyone in the room had it except to doctor and nurse—it was 
impossible not to be contaminated.’
 » ‘Full PPE for those staff caring for and in close proximity to swine flu patients—
uncomfortable and hot. Information with masks and alcohol rub placed at entry to ED—
some patients did not see these and proceeded to triage desk.’
 » ‘Separate waiting area for flu suspects negative pressure room for examination and swabbing 
suspects provided with surgical masks.’
Staff support
Things that respondents reported as being supportive and useful included: education and 
briefings; clear guidelines, policies, and protocols; extra staffing; extra supplies from stores; and 
antivirals.
They also reported they found their colleagues and senior nursing and medical staff supportive 
and understanding of sick leave needs. Infection Control/Infectious Diseases Departments were 
reported as helpful, as was the provision of vaccination. However, many said there was nothing 
their organisation did that helped.
The issues that respondents found unsupportive of their needs during the pandemic were, on the 
whole, things they lacked. These included a lack of staff and a poor skill mix, which led to overwork 
of the staff remaining in the ED, combined with no acknowledgement by management of the 
pressure ED staff were under. They also cited lack of supplies—such as medications (including 
prophylactic antivirals), PPE, and swabs—and a lack of clear, concise information and education. 
Physical space constraints, especially triage and isolation, were a problem for some, as was access 
block when no extra beds were opened. There was a perception that Infection Control and Public 
Health were critical, demanding, or not interested rather than supportive. There was an increase 
in paperwork, phone calls, and data collection. Some mentioned there was no flu clinic, or if there 
was one, it was not open out of hours.
Positive quotes
 » ‘Infection control personnel visiting and being accessible via phone as needed.’
 » ‘ED management demanded that fit testing of N95 masks with training to occur for all staff 
despite state department saying it would not occur as we were not a ‘Flu Hospital’’
 » ‘ED admin tirelessly worked to sufficiently staff the ED although staff were sick etc.’
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 » ‘One ED senior staff member attempting to clarify advice from Public Health/admin and put 
this in a useful form for ED’
 » ‘Employed nurse (level 3) to assist with fit testing, updates, education.’
Negative quotes
 » ‘Except for about 3 days—the ED staffing ratio was not increased to cope with extra demands 
on ED—really needed two triage nurses—patients could not be observed properly as too 
busy triaging new presentations.’
 » ‘Suggestions that ED staff should work extra shifts and cancel non-clinical duties, whilst no 
one else in the hospital was called on to assist, and no measures made to improve access 
block.’
 » ‘Isolation and how manage rooms—no extra cleaners allocated. No debrief for staff who 
looked after patients considered high risk.’
 » ‘Infection control kept saying it was our role to screen I however feel we are not a clinic 
we cannot cope with volume and they should have provided a staff member who could be 
designated to screen a filter swine flu patients.’
 » ‘No replacement of medical staff who were absent due to illness during times of increased ED 
presentations.’
Help from employers that respondents did not receive during illness
Most respondents said that there was nothing that they wanted from their employers during their 
illness. However, several said they wanted workers’ compensation or special leave as they had 
to use their accumulated sick leave or annual leave. Other things mentioned included advice on 
testing, quarantine, and when to return to work, and the provision of antivirals.
Quotes
 » ‘I’m sure I caught whatever I had from work, and I would have thought they may have given 
paid leave as opposed to sick leave. We had to demonstrate that we had cared directly for a 
patient with swine flu.’
 » ‘Workers compensation rather than using sick leave, as it was highly likely that my illness was 
directly related to patients in contact with.’
 » ‘There was some pressure to return to work after 3 days. Antivirals/isolation, despite the fact 
I was quite unwell with ongoing severe respiratory symptoms.’
 » ‘I wanted to be tested for swine flu, a close colleague was a confirmed case but I became 
unwell 2 days later and we had moved into the (protect) phase so the hospital infection 
control did not offer testing. Also I was sick on my rostered days off, so no sick leave.’
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Other reasons for missing work
Other reasons respondents cited for missing work during the pandemic included having an 
unrelated illness, the illness of another family member, being quarantined, fatigue, annual leave, 
and depression following major bushfires.
Feelings or concerns about the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza vaccine and getting 
vaccinated
A very strong perception emerged amongst respondents that the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza vaccine was rushed into production, potentially not properly tested, and may have had 
severe side effects. Many felt that they had already been exposed to, or had the virus, so probably 
didn’t need vaccination. Others stated that they would not be vaccinated as Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Influenza is usually a mild illness and they do not usually get the seasonal influenza vaccine. 
Others stated that the vaccine came out too late in the flu season to be useful and that they would 
get it when it was included in the next seasonal influenza vaccine. Many felt that multidose vials 
were a barrier to them getting the vaccine. Those who said they would get the vaccine said they 
would do so to protect themselves, their families, and their patients.
Quotes
 » ‘Not sure about the safety and efficacy of a vaccine that has been ‘rushed’ through for the sake 
of immunising against another strain of the flu—more people die of this than swine flu. Also 
use of multi-dose vials—not safe! !’
 » ‘Now pregnant and unable to find any evidence of first trimester safety or reasonable testing 
of second or third trimester safety of the vaccine. Think the vaccine has been introduced too 
quickly without proper trials and that we may be in trouble in a few months due to adverse 
effects.’
 » ‘Concerned re potential side effects, risk vs benefit of the vaccine—my experience has been 
that the swine flu virus caused severe symptoms at the extremes of age, in patients with 
significant co-morbidities and minor symptoms in others. Will wait until at least next year to 
have vaccine to ensure no adverse effects from vaccine.’
 » ‘No don’t think been tested properly issues with litigation re safety. Appears a knee jerk 
reaction. What about encourage staff to have a healthy immune system regular breaks, not 
working staff to bone with extra shifts etc.’
 » ‘No concerns, just think it’s the sensible thing to do to reduce risk to self and family 
members.’
 » ‘Will have swine flu incorporated into Fluvax.’
Was this a health emergency—why or why not?
Many respondents appeared undecided as to whether the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza was 
a health emergency or not. Those who felt that it needed to be treated as an emergency did so 
because it was impossible to predict how the pandemic would develop, and it had the potential 
to be devastating. They also felt it was an emergency in vulnerable groups, and in terms of public 
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health. They pointed to a greatly increased ED workload, which was sometimes overwhelming. 
Those who felt it was not an emergency thought it was a predictable cyclic event like seasonal 
influenza, and that the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic was a media driven event. There were 
those who voiced the opinion that it was a good trial run that showed up existing system failures.
Quotes
 » ‘Very small proportion of unwell people will require medical care; our society is ‘over-
medicalised’ and has been made worse by the panic over this flu.’
 » ‘It is not a severe disease, but it is a health emergency due to the panic created in the 
population and subsequent increase workload on the EDs and work absenteeism due to 
quarantine protocols or concern regarding personal safety.’
 » ‘Media and political emergency. May well return once further mutated as a genuine problem, 
by which time general public will be overexposed to hype and a genuine emergency will be 
ignored.’
 » ‘The majority of people suffer a very mild illness. Each year there are a percentage of sufferers 
of flu who experience life threatening complications or death without any of this hysteria.’
 » ‘So far the illness is no worse than usual flu.’
 » ‘Like with the usual flu: it’s only a health emergency if it compromises vital body functions 
such as the airway, breathing, circulation.’
Should Emergency Departments take responsibility for managing pandemic influenza?
Those who felt it was not an ED responsibility believed pandemic influenza should be managed 
by public health departments, GPs, and flu clinics, unless the patients were critically ill. They cited 
lack of capacity and the risk of cross infection of already unwell patients as their main reasons. 
Those who felt it was an ED responsibility felt that EDs are the ‘front door’ of the health system, 
and people with influenza should not be turned away. Some felt that it was an appropriate short-
term responsibility. Most respondents stated that the ED’s role was to collaborate and cooperate 
with other agencies. Some respondents said it should be left up to individual communities—often 
EDs are the only option in rural areas.
Quotes
 » ‘EDs are already heavily overcrowded. When the ED has to deal with mild to moderate cases 
of flu it places enormous strain on the staff and places critically ill patients at risk.’
 » ‘Although expert clinical care is required—designated flu / clinics / stations / hospitals 
should be allocated as if a ‘real’ pandemic with really deadly consequences we would have 
wiped out the organisation / hospital / staff and patients—we are not fundamentally set up 
for a true full on epidemic/ it is not our core business.’
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 » ‘Because all people in the ED both in the dept and waiting room and staff are put at risk for 
transmission and other people are already unwell for other reasons, and are placed at further 
risk. Most people who had the flu felt terrible, but were not ‘emergencies’.’
 » ‘The volume of swine flu cases took us to the brink of breaking point. At one stage I was 
unable to move any patients within the ED and had people with strokes and chest pain sitting 
unmonitored and unobserved in triage areas. EDs are already overloaded by the everyday 
cases, swine flu!’
 » ‘EDs bear the main brunt of pandemic management but the pandemic response needs to 
be co-ordinated from a central source ensuring the same line is taken Australia-wide. Could 
be state department (who did terribly) or a central ‘pandemic response team’ consisting of 
Emergency Consultants, Infectious Diseases Consultants etc.’
Suggestions for improvement
Respondents identified planning, preparation, and practice of the pandemic plan with the creation 
of appropriate surge capacity by addressing already existing access block as important areas for 
improvement. It was considered necessary to include clinicians from the whole hospital, pathology 
departments, and GPs, as well as members of the community. Improvements in the physical design 
of EDs to facilitate the isolation of infectious patients with appropriate patient flow through the 
department were mentioned, as was the provision of flu clinics in close proximity to EDs. Single 
source, clear, concise, and timely communication was emphasised as being important, as was 
responsible media reporting. Extra staffing and special pandemic funding were mentioned. Staff 
vaccination was also identified as important.
Quotes
 » ‘Need to be prepared! The guidelines were sent out too late and much time wasted trying to 
contact state department to determine correct management of initial swine flu cases.’
 » ‘Early risk assessment will help, and perhaps three layers of plans depending on the kill 
rate expected, i.e. the response to a mild flu is mainly a problem for GPs, EDs, and surge in 
walking cases, but a high ICU admission rate flu is not well planned for in our institution.’
 » ‘Need more support from other in-patient specialties e.g. briefed general medical staff could 
come to ED isolation area or flu clinic and see some of the less sick patients.’
 » ‘Regional approach, with support of state department.’
 » ‘Eliminating contradictory information.’
 » ‘We will need to radically rethink the designs for departments for cohorting, isolation, and 
flow of patients.’
 » ‘High involvement of clinical staff in planning at site level.’
 » ‘Hire dedicated staff, don’t expect already overloaded staff to carry the extra load.’
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 » ‘Clear, consistent protocols for managing patient flow, updated daily as more information 
about the disease becomes apparent.’
 » ‘Public information campaigns akin to those about triage, 000 emergency calls, ambulance 
usage etc., which encourage people with typical flu symptoms to stay out of hospitals, i.e. 
decrease demand from the worried well.’
Other comments
Many respondents stated that the pandemic period was an extremely busy, stressful time, with 
low staff morale. Reasons for this included generally being overworked due to high numbers of 
presentations in an already significantly overworked and under-resourced area. Respondents stated 
there were seriously unwell patients whom they felt were neglected because of high numbers of 
‘worried well’ presenting. Screening was mentioned as an additional burden, which could have 
been performed elsewhere. Some felt that GPs had referred patients inappropriately instead of 
dealing with them themselves. The media were cited as scaremongering, and it was noted that 
community education advertisements on television would have been helpful. There was a general 
feeling that there should be better planning and resourcing in the case of future pandemics.
However, it was also felt by some respondents that their hospital responded well given that this is 
the first pandemic most have faced. It was also felt to be a good trial run of pandemic plans and an 
opportunity to fine-tune them for the future.
Quotes
 » ‘Made work unpleasant for me due to overcrowding and seeing boring worried well patients 
who shouldn’t have been there meant we didn’t give as good care to sick patients. By the 
end of it all I hated the stupid flu and everything associated with it. We spent so much time 
fussing over who should be swabbed, who needs to be isolated we weren’t focusing on who 
was sick and the care they needed.’
 » ‘The difficulty of dealing with the pandemic was compounded by the lack of redundancy in 
our staffing—we were already short-staffed medically when the pandemic hit and absences 
due to illness as well as doctors being drawn away to staff flu clinics made the situation in 
the department stressful, overcrowded and, at times, unsafe. We were short-staffed by 2–3 
doctors at the busiest times for several weekends in a row (Saturday and Sunday afternoon/
evening shifts).’
 » ‘It was difficult as the public were not well informed, a lot of sick leave so a great deal of stress 
on the workers left, maybe having access to extra staff in future pandemics would be handy, 
also I was very concerned about exposing family to my work infection, our ED was very 
supportive to staff both in information, prevention and treatment.’
 » ‘It was a very stressful time with a lot of additional pressure on the staff and frustration at 
being unable to give proper attention to genuinely ill patients (including those severely 
affected by the swine flu) due to lack of nursing and medical staff, increase in patient 
presentations, and increase in workload.’
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 » ‘The community were scared by the media and ill-informed, which created a massive increase 
in ED workloads. The number of really critically ill patients in our ED was relatively low to 
the presentations, yet antivirals was dispensed for even the vaguest symptoms.’
 » ‘We need to work together and discuss issues before they arise—rationing of care, decreased 
standards of care, staff contact lists need to be up to date. Need to support staff who cannot or 
choose not to work with patients with swine flu.’
 » ‘I thought our ED responded very well and staff managed extremely well; other wards and 
staff could have been more understanding of extra stresses the ED and staff were under.’
 » ‘Increased workload and no recognition for it.’
 » ‘Screening in ED is a misuse of resources at a time of already heightened activity.’
 » ‘A good trial for a real pandemic, but I’m not sure management aware how bad it could have 
got if swine flu had been more lethal.’
Directors’ survey
Response rate
Surveys were sent via email to the Directors of Emergency Medicine of all 96 Australian teaching 
hospitals. The email list was based on information provided by ACEM. Usable responses were 
received from 14 directors (14.6%).
Demographics of respondents’ hospitals and Emergency Departments
Over half of the respondents were directors from hospitals in NSW (five out of nine, as shown in 
Table B-1). The other respondents were one each from Northern Territory, Queensland, South 
Australia, and Western Australia.  The Directors of Emergency Medicine led EDs in a variety of 
hospitals sizes, from small (1–249 beds) to large (500–759 beds), but none responded from very 
large hospitals (more than 750 beds). EDs represented ranged from having 1–10 doctors and 
1–30 nurses (full-time equivalents) to 41–50 doctors and more than 91 nurses. One of the EDs 
represented had a relatively small number of annual presentations (20,000 or fewer), whilst five of 
the nine had between 41,000 and 60,000 presentations.
All but one of the responding Directors of Emergency Medicine worked at public hospitals, which 
reflects the concentration of EDs in public hospitals. Seven out of nine respondents were from 
hospitals in capital cities and two were from major regional hospitals.
Two emergency departments reported having no dedicated biohazard or isolation beds, whilst 
four had one bed, two had two beds, and one had three beds. Five out of six described their 
biohazard or isolation beds as being in negative pressure rooms, whilst one said it was not in a 
negative pressure room.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
48
Infectious disease wards and flu clinics
Roughly half (54%) of the responding hospitals had infectious disease wards, and 64% reported a 
flu clinic being set up in their health service district during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic 
as shown in Table B-2. Of those with a local flu clinic, most were in the hospital, although only one 
was within the ED itself. The remaining three clinics were outside the hospital. Three respondents 
reported that their ED had the primary responsibility for running the flu clinic, whilst for two, 
this responsibility fell to another hospital department. In one area, the flu clinic was run by a 
community organisation and in another, it was run by a nearby hospital. Local flu clinics were 
staffed by ED staff, other hospital staff, and in one case, community health staff.
Pandemic and disaster plans
All but one of the directors reported that a pandemic plan was in place for their department 
before Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, as shown in Table B-3. Of the 11 plans, 10 were part of 
a general hospital plan and one was a stand-alone ED plan. In seven out of ten cases, the pandemic 
plan was activated during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic, and amongst these responses, 
most directors found the plan useful. In responding to open-ended questions about what was 
specifically useful, or not useful, about the activated pandemic plan, directors referred to clear 
guidelines (e.g. for triage), lines of responsibility, setting up a ‘fever clinic’, and the involvement of 
other areas of the hospital, as being useful. Several of those mentioning the ‘not useful’ aspects of 
their pandemic plan also referred to other members of their hospital’s staff, saying, for instance, 
that they had not shared the load. Also mentioned as problematic was the lack of staff management 
strategies, and that staff had not been pre-fitted for respirators.
Directors were given the opportunity to make suggestions for developing ED-related pandemic 
plans for managing future pandemics. Directors of Emergency Medicine recommended that flu 
clinics be established early, so that EDs are not required to deal with the full volume of patients. 
They pointed to the critical importance of community and public health involvement from the 
beginning. Improvement in communication strategies was also mentioned, as was better provision 
of isolation facilities within EDs and better staff management strategies (filling in, redeployment, 
etc.).
Directors were also asked whether their hospital’s formal disaster plan had been activated during 
the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic. No disasters plans were activated.
Departmental responses to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza
All respondents who answered the questions said their ED had developed a specific clinical 
protocol to deal with suspected Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza presentations. In most of these 
EDs (8t out of 10), the protocol had to be changed multiple times during the pandemic, as shown 
in Table B-4. One hospital reported that no changes were necessary, and the remaining one needed 
to change their protocol once.
Directors were asked whether any of four types of administrative measures were employed to 
manage the pandemic and whether they were useful as shown in Table B-5. Separate reception 
areas were employed by three out of 10 EDs, changed visiting policies in half (5 out of 10), 
referring cases to GPs in four, and changes in the overall model of care in half (5 out of 10). 
Except for one who did not find separate reception areas useful, all directors who employed these 
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measures found them useful to manage the pandemic. Other useful administrative measures 
mentioned by directors included running a flu clinic within the ED, face masks at triage, and 
moving away from nebulisers in favour of puffers or spacers. One director pointed to the physical 
difficulties in isolating patients.
In terms of preventive measures to stop the spread of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza amongst 
patients and visitors to the ED, all of the responding EDs took the following actions: isolating 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza patients (suspected or confirmed) within the ED; requiring 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza patients to wear surgical masks (if medically able); and 
installing signage concerning cough etiquette and hand-washing techniques , as shown in Table 
B-6. Nine out of ten EDs provided alcohol-based hand rubs. Other measures taken by fewer 
EDs include: transfer of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza patients to a special ward or isolation 
bay outside the ED (two hospitals); providing antivirals to family members or contacts (four 
hospitals); and providing masks to family members or patients without Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza (three hospitals).
For measures to prevent staff from becoming infected with Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, 
all responding EDs used alcohol-based hand rubs; eight used N95 or P2 respirators; eight 
redeployed at-risk staff (those at high risk of severe illness from Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza) 
to areas with a lower risk of exposure; six used standard surgical masks; and two used antivirals 
in a preventive manner with staff. Directors of Emergency Medicine were asked to describe any 
redeployment of staff during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic. Six directors described risk 
factors causing staff redeployment (pregnancy, co-morbidities, etc) or the process by which staff 
self-selected for such redeployment (for example, that all staff were asked to notify an appropriate 
person if they wished to be redeployed so that privacy was protected). One director mentioned 
redeployment to staff a flu clinic.
Effect of pandemic on Emergency Departments
Respondents were given a series of commonly reported issues within EDs and asked how much 
difficulty they had experienced with these issues in their department during the (H1N1) 2009 
influenza pandemic, as shown in Table B-7. The issues with the most respondents reporting a high 
level of difficulty were: lack of space for patients in the ED; increased demand; and access block to 
non-ICU wards. Less difficulty was reported with patient or family aggression, lack of medication 
or treatments, and redeployment of at-risk staff. More moderate levels of difficulty (or mixed 
difficulty levels) were: falling below minimum skill mix requirements; filling staff deficits; staff 
absenteeism; lack of supplies and equipment; and access block to ICU.
In the section about other very difficult issues during the pandemic, two Directors of Emergency 
Medicine mentioned communicating with GPs and the community regarding changes related to 
the different phases of the pandemic, and continuing education of staff regarding repeated changes 
in case definition. In identifying which issue was the most difficult, three directors mentioned 
difficulties stemming from the increased demand (overcrowding, isolation capacity), one focused 
on the administrative overload, and one mentioned the aggravation of access block. Another 
director felt that the worst difficulty was managing staff who needed counselling and antivirals and 
one director found accessing accurate information difficult. Other difficult issues mentioned in 
the open-ended comments included: lack of a flu clinic; frequently changing plans and protocols; 
finding adequately trained staff; and general logistics.
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Half the directors felt that the amount of sick or family leave taken by ED staff during the (H1N1) 
2009 influenza pandemic was greater compared with a normal flu season. The other half felt it was 
about the same as usual. None thought it was less than usual. (See Table B-8).
Data was considered by the Reference Group and investigators to identify its relevance for policy 
and direction. All of the members of the research team were involved in the preparation, review, 
and editing of the report and the preparation of articles for consideration of publication in 
scientific literature.
5.  Discussion
Introduction
The consequences of disasters are not restricted to those immediately affected. Pandemics in 
particular have widespread community repercussions, including influencing international trade 
and the economy. In this instance, the pandemic coincided with an evolving global financial crisis; 
a situation well understood by those in poor countries who often experience the compounding 
effect of economic deprivation and natural disasters. It demonstrated the benefits of international 
collaboration, whilst at the same time reminding the world community of the rapidity with 
which such infections can spread globally in the era of international jet travel. The message for 
Australia is clear—we cannot embargo ourselves from such pandemics despite our large ‘moat’, 
and border control will not protect us when international travel will deliver infected patients to the 
community within the incubation period of a virus. We need to remain vigilant and be prepared 
to respond. We also need to understand the effect of pandemics on the community and on health 
services in particular.
The aim of this study was to examine the ramifications of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza for 
EDs in Australia so as to better understand the nature of those impacts and to apply their lessons 
to future response management.
The operational context
The Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak exhibited many of the generic features of a 
disaster. It showed not only the broad scope of the event, but also the challenge of managing such 
incidents in the light of evolving information. Initial estimates of mortality proved to be inaccurate, 
and the final mortality rate, whilst unknown, is likely to be less than 0.1% of those affected. The 
actual incidence of the disease remains unknown, and only population-based antibody testing 
is likely to produce such a figure. Whilst the disease proved to be mild in most people, a small 
number of people appeared to be at particular risk, including pregnant women, patients with 
morbid obesity, and those with chronic respiratory disease. Of interest was the relative protection 
offered to the elderly, those usually at most risk. The final mortality rate appears considerably less 
than the annual mortality of influenza. However, the rates may not be comparable as the latter is 
based on epidemiological analysis and the former on proven disease.
International disclosure of the existence of the pandemic and concerns about the threat of 
this disease caused understandable alarm within the community. Based on initial assessments, 
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authorities warned the public of the dangers of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, although 
information about the disease was rapidly evolving. The public presented in significant numbers 
to hospital EDs, which were relatively ill-prepared to manage large numbers of infectious patients, 
whilst already under stress from crowding associated with growing demand and access block. The 
pandemic demonstrated the difficulty of managing infectious patients at any time within EDs. EDs 
have championed open design to maintain visibility; however, these designs are not conducive to 
infection control. Curtains make relatively poor barriers and limit any capacity for environmental 
control.
The emergency medical system has extensive capacity and deals with over 17,000 patients each 
day throughout Australia68. Most effort is directed towards trying to enable the system to cope 
with the range of challenges it confronts on a daily basis. Crowding of EDs is a reality, and in the 
immediate future must be accepted as the environment within which disaster response must be 
managed. However, there is little ‘give’ in a system that remains under considerable stress69.
There is also a continuum in challenges confronting EDs, ranging from a busy day to catastrophes. 
Some people believe EDs should have the capacity to manage catastrophes without compromising 
existing standards of care. This is unrealistic. Catastrophes by their nature require changes in the 
way patients are managed, and changes to the extent and standards of care. At the most minor level 
there may be an increased wait for treatment whilst in the extreme a decision about which patients 
will have access to health care at all may need to be made. However, catastrophes are also very rare 
and most events should be able to be managed within the resources available. Some institutional 
plans incorporate the use of ED as overflow for maintaining patients on long-term ventilators if 
ICUs are full. However, if ICUs are full, it may be concluded that EDs are also experiencing similar 
pressures.
Efficient and effective clinical management of patients is critical to the management of disasters 
within EDs. Many ED staff identified inconsistency of information as a cause of distress. 
However, the rapid development of consistent clinical standards and standardised approaches 
was recognised as a critical element of disaster management. Staff also identified the potential 
danger of the ‘VIP patient’. This is a well-recognised hazard within health disaster management, in 
which patients from the ‘event’ take priority over patients with other conditions. There was a clear 
view that managing this issue in EDs had an adverse effect on other patients, including those with 
serious illnesses. The principle of ED triage needs to be further emphasised in the environment of 
disasters and pandemics. All patients need to be considered in relation to the urgency and severity 
of their illness, regardless of the cause of that illness.
Stockpiling resources is an essential part of preparedness. Issues arose during the (H1N1) 2009 
influenza pandemic about accessibility and availability of stockpiled items, and their relationship 
to items in general use. ED staff recognised the value of certain stockpiled items, whilst other 
items were not helpful. The ‘embedded stockpile’ needs to be managed. For example, most health 
facilities already maintain stocks of masks and antiviral agents, both in bulk stores and distributed 
throughout the operational units. In the event of a major incident these stocks are the first to be 
used, and constitute the first level of a stockpile hierarchy, which also includes institutional stores, 
jurisdictional bulk stores, and finally national dedicated stockpiles. The introduction of ‘just in 
time’ stores management has effectively reduced the embedded stockpiles. Embedded stockpiles 
need to be secured and distributed to complement the strategic management approach.
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Centrally held and dedicated stockpiles also need to be distributed in a coordinated way. At 
the same time, the production and distribution chain needs to be identified and secured to 
ensure availability of appropriate resources.  Principles and guidelines for using and distributing 
stockpiled items are an essential part of disaster management protocols. Staff noted that 
stockpiles were available for PPE and antiviral agents. However, concerns were expressed about 
the distribution and availability and the policies for their use. In particular, there appears to be 
considerable inconsistency in the use of antiviral agents for primary or secondary prophylaxis of 
staff. Standards are necessary to avoid confusion, and these standards should be developed as part 
of preparedness and planning.
The planning context
The H1N1 (2009) influenza pandemic came to a health care environment sensitised by SARS 
and Avian Influenza. Thus there was a level of preparedness unknown in previous outbreaks of 
pandemic influenza. National pandemic plans had been developed based on a WHO model, 
and provision had been made for stockpiling of antiviral agents and PPE. Yet this pandemic also 
demonstrated the difficulties in dealing with unclear and evolving information. Initial concern 
about a high mortality based on Mexican and USA estimates was not sustained, but did engender 
an initial reaction appropriate to a more serious challenge. This response changed as more accurate 
information became available. Australia had been proactive in pandemic planning. National and 
state plans were in place and a majority of staff indicated that there were plans in place at the local 
level. Some EDs had their own pandemic plans. Most ED staff recognised the value of planning 
and found the plans to be helpful in most elements. However a significant number of staff were 
unaware of the existence of plans within their own local environment. Staff found the plans 
generally useful in defining resources required, governance arrangements, and defining activity. 
Concerns with the plans related to a perceived lack of local relevance and application. Further 
fine-tuning of the planning framework would be valuable to ensure a balance between central 
standardisation of policies and procedures, and local relevance.
Of significance was the relationship between the pandemic planning approach and disaster 
planning. A small proportion of staff reported the activation of their organisation’s disaster plan. 
Some individuals felt activating disaster plans would have delivered a higher level of support. The 
relationship between pandemic and disaster planning needs to be clarified. Whilst pandemics 
undoubtedly qualify as disasters, their gradual development and prolonged nature inhibit the 
sense of urgency and crisis that characterises most disasters. However, the principles of disaster 
management do need to be engaged and applied in this environment. Pandemic planning should 
be incorporated within the disaster planning framework, whilst recognising the prolonged 
nature and the special considerations required. Pandemic plans need to recognise the disaster 
management principles, which are necessary in managing major incidents with significant health 
impacts. Many ED staff are confident in their leading role in the response phase of other disasters, 
but appeared to consider that they should not play such a leading role in managing pandemics. 
Health system command and control arrangements need to be clear and consistent regardless of 
the hazard, and pandemic management should use these principles and processes.
In the response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, a system-wide coordinated approach was 
developed. The establishment of flu clinics reduced the pressure on poorly designed EDs as 
patients were redirected to flu clinics. However often flu clinics were created by the EDs from 
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within their own establishment, and this did little to reduce the stress on already under-resourced 
and overcrowded departments.
Staff did raise concerns about the availability and use of PPE. Staff indicated that working in PPE 
all the time was another source of distress. In addition, there was some variability with the access 
to, and availability of, antiviral agents.
Impact on Emergency Departments
The outbreak caused a considerable impact on hospital EDs in Australia. Increases in demand 
ranged from 1.4 to 3 times the expected annual attendance for ILI. Staff considered that the 
majority of patients were, in this instance, suffering from relatively mild illness interspersed with a 
small number of serious ill patients. Each of the patients, however, imposed a significant burden on 
the ED, requiring not only assessment, diagnosis, and intervention, but also isolation and follow 
up, even if discharged.
Standard clinical guidelines are a necessary element of effective disaster management. Staff within 
EDs appreciated the guidelines provided to them. However, there was evidence of inconsistent 
application of these guidelines, sometimes driven by local expert advice, which was contrary to the 
international and national standards. There is a need to consistently apply the guidelines in disaster 
and pandemic scenarios and this may require discipline by all staff.
The Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza outbreak demonstrated considerable difficulties in 
managing patients within the ED environment. EDs are not constructed to manage patients with 
infectious diseases; they are constructed to promote the overview of patients. This challenge must 
confront those caring for patients with infectious diseases, such as meningitis or tuberculosis, 
who present to the department on a daily basis. Management of infectious patients should be 
taken into consideration in the design of EDs, and further consideration should be given to the 
ability to isolate patients on an individual basis, or collectively in the event of a major outbreak. 
Regardless of the severity of the outbreak, some patients will require ED attendance as they will 
be critically ill. EDs should not expose other patients, some of whom will be critically ill and 
possibly immunocompromised, to potential fatal infectious illnesses. There is a risk that other 
non-infectious patients who present with serious illness during a major incident may potentially 
receive less attention that they usually would because of the coincidental event. However, isolation 
of patients may limit their access to health care, as staff tend to avoid casual interaction because of 
the need to consider enhanced infection control protocols.
As a prelude to any physical design changes, changes in work practices may be necessary. For 
example, EDs may need to function as an isolation area implementing enhanced precautions 
including hand washing, masks, and uniform changes on entry and exit. Visitors would be 
subjected to similar infection control procedures, and their numbers may have to be limited. 
Whilst the physical environment may not be changed easily, behaviours can be.
Significant workforce issues were confronted in this pandemic. Staff in EDs were exposed to illness 
and the difficulties of working in PPE for prolonged periods. The difficulty of working in PPE 
is demonstrated by limits imposed on fire fighters working in fully enclosed PPE. Even working 
with masks limits communication, and is uncomfortable. Some staff were deployed during the 
pandemic to areas outside their normal work environment, and therefore outside their comfort 
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zone. Working in an unfamiliar environment is known to increase clinical risk131. Most such 
redeployment was undertaken for ‘operational’ reasons—to staff flu clinics or other areas with 
significant staff shortages. However, some staff had to be redeployed because of particular risk 
factors such as pregnancy. The additional staffing requirements for major incidents are a challenge 
for pandemic management.
The literature has often referred to concerns that, during pandemics, staff would be less likely to 
respond than during other events because of the potential risk the illness posed to themselves and 
their families. However, this study did not confirm this concern. There was some evidence that 
unexplained absenteeism actually fell during the pandemic, as loyalty to colleagues outweighed 
the personal risk. This may be a direct consequence of the relatively mild nature of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Influenza. Nevertheless there is a need to ensure protection of staff and their families 
to minimise risk and to provide reassurance to staff so that they will continue to present at work.
The requirement to report data on the pandemic caused considerable additional distress for 
staff within EDs, which compounded the stress of additional workload. Ad hoc and repeated 
demands for data caused considerable angst. A single and simple reporting framework needs to 
be developed for pandemics to avoid this drain on already stretched senior ED staff. In addition, 
the implementation of disaster response principles should ensure additional administrative staff 
assigned to EDs to ensure that data collection and reporting does not impact on clinical staff and 
their capacity to care for patients. At the same time, there is a need for authorities at all levels to 
understand the burden of their requests for information and to exert discipline over the repeated 
nature of those requests.
This issue also exposes the gap between public health planning and clinical care. In most instances 
during the (H1N1) 2009 influenza pandemic, public health did not have the operational capacity 
to provide follow up and contact tracing. This task fell to EDs by default. This is beyond the normal 
scope of practice of most EDs and was also difficult to achieve in the midst of a pandemic.
Many staff raised concerns, and were critical about patients who did not attend their GPs, and 
critical about some GPs who referred patients to EDs too quickly. Such criticism may not reflect 
an understanding of the reality of general practice and its limited capacity to offer appropriate care 
of acute infectious patients. In this instance, GPs had the same exposure to conflicting information 
as ED staff. The establishment of flu clinics was widely considered appropriate. Further thought 
needs to be given to how these clinics interact with GPs, and consideration should be given to 
reducing the drain on EDs by staffing flu clinics with externally sourced personnel. GPs could be 
seconded to the clinics. Better relationships between EDs, community health clinics, and GPs 
should be at the core of future planning for pandemic responses.
Another issue raised by this study was the divide between federal and state responsibilities in 
health care, as exposed by the question about who pays GPs if they work in state hospitals in these 
circumstances. How do GPs access PPE? Disaster management arrangements should provide 
funding mechanisms that eliminate these boundary issues.
Mobile assessment teams may be more useful in pandemic conditions. The movement of infected 
patients within the community exposes others to the disease. Mobile flu clinics could help patients 
remain isolated in their own homes.
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Impact on Emergency Department staff
This study confirms anecdotal feedback that ED staff experienced significant stress during the 
pandemic from an exacerbation of pre-existing conditions of high demand and access block.
The distress of staff was significantly increased by concerns with the flow of information. 
Respondents reported multiple sources of information, which were often conflicting and 
voluminous. Daily updates were difficult to digest and unclear about what information had 
changed. Different sources of information such as state, national and international authorities, 
often conflicted with local advice. The tendency to trust local advice is understandable; however, 
on this occasion some sources of such advice conflicted with national authoritative advice and 
added to the confusion. Staff appealed for a single source of authoritative advice. Anecdotal 
feedback from China and the USA demonstrated less difficulty with information consistency. In 
the USA, the CDC remained the sole and unarguable source of independent advice, which was 
deemed to be independent of government and political interference, even though the CDC is a 
federal government agency. In China, colleagues expressed surprise that Australian Government 
directives would be challenged.
The issue of consistent advice is an area requiring clarification and discipline. It is understandable 
that local infectious disease consultants, even those fully aware of pandemic and disaster 
management, should express views based on rapidly accessible information. However, they also 
need to recognise that one of the core principles of disaster management is a tight and disciplined 
command and control arrangement. Equally, national and jurisdictional authorities need to accept 
that consistent and disciplined authoritative advice, which is seen to be independent, is essential to 
reassure the public.
The media played a significant role, not only in distributing information, but also in creating 
confusion. Local media seek local ‘talent’ and view attempts to control messages as manipulation. 
News stories include conflict, and media may seek conflict between authorities as a means of 
creating stories. Whilst respecting the critical role the media plays within a democracy, conflicting 
and confusing information can be destructive during a pandemic. There is a need for clear, 
consistent communication. A communication strategy should be reviewed in detail, with media 
networks engaged in the review, so future communication pathways facilitate an unambiguous 
message and congruent response. 
An effective communication strategy will require discipline—hospital executives, managers, and 
clinicians need to commit to using information from a single authoritative source and not be 
distracted by opinions, which, even if they are later proven to be correct, will cause confusion and 
potentially more harm than good.
Staff also raised concerns about methods of communication. Individual preferences for 
communication channels (websites, bulletins, emails, and media) cannot provide a single 
optimal method. All communication channels should be used, but with a consistent message 
and simplified approach. The message needs to be crafted to provide genuine updates against 
a backdrop of the underlying information. Staff reported an inability to glean new information 
from long updates, which may have repeatedly included all background information. At the same 
time, new readers may not be aware of the history. Messages need to be crafted to highlight new 
information whilst providing access to background information.
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The issue of testing staff for illness needs to be clarified. If they contracted the disease, staff were 
required to take leave for quarantine purposes. However, once testing ceased, diagnosis was 
speculative, and staff lacked direction on how to comply appropriately with quarantine. There 
was also concern about staff entitlements. Staff required to take leave post exposure or because of 
actual illness questioned their entitlements to workers’ compensation for an illness that may or 
may not have been acquired at work, but which prevented them from attending work for public 
health reasons.
Access to standard infection control processes and equipment were widespread and, from all 
appearances, complied with reasonably well. Debate continues about the relative effectiveness 
of the N95 or standard surgical masks in pandemic response. Hand washing and isolation were 
standard and available, although the self-reporting nature of this study meant the effectiveness of 
these processes and procedures are unknown. There is, however, no evidence of any significant 
secondary outbreak within EDs, and the level of reported absenteeism appears less than the 
general community despite the higher risk of exposure. Infection control procedures within EDs 
are in need of review, for both normal functioning and infectious disease outbreaks.
There was some concern with policies regarding the use of antiviral medications. No decision 
was made at any time to offer antiviral agents as standard prophylaxis. Feedback from the studies 
demonstrated that secondary prophylaxis with antiviral agents was inconsistent. Many staff 
objected to requirements to take antivirals, whilst others expressed anger that antivirals were 
not made available to them. Considerable thought needs to be given to this issue, and to the 
development of prophylaxis policies in critical care areas such as EDs, including the circumstances 
in which uniform routine prophylaxis is offered. Consideration should also be given to whether 
prophylactic antivirals should be compulsory, and alternatives for those who decline should be 
investigated.
Staff were variable in their response to personal support. Understandably, the level of support 
declined with the distance from the individual; peer support was most appreciated whilst state and 
federal government support was least regarded. Little can be drawn from this observation except 
to ensure that this local trust forms the basis of individual support, and that peer and local unit 
management support should form the basis of staff resilience.
Staff exhibited mixed attitudes to vaccination. Whilst only a small fraction of staff were vaccinated 
at the time of the surveys, a significant proportion indicated that they did not intend to be 
vaccinated. It is unclear whether this attitude related to the mild nature of the illness or other 
attitudes. Concerns were expressed about risks attached to the vaccine due to its relative fast 
tracking through testing and manufacture. This was augmented by public debate on this issue—a 
debate which was compounded by the vaccine being presented in multi-dose vials. Anecdotal 
reports were received of clinics refusing to offer the vaccine for single requests. Some of these 
concerns were eased by later strategies around the use of schools as distribution points and the 
incorporation of the vaccine into the seasonal flu vaccine.
Conclusion and lessons
Considering the evolving nature of this pandemic and its widespread nature, on all accounts the 
pandemic was managed reasonably well, both generally and within EDs in particular. Any issues 
identified within this report are offered to improve management in the future, not to criticise the 
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way in which the pandemic was managed on this occasion. Those who offer such criticisms often 
lack any experience of having to manage complex organisations in complex situations.
The outcome of these studies has identified some significant lessons for planning and preparedness 
for pandemics in general, and for the normal operations of EDs:
 » There is a need for a single authoritative source of information that is well regarded and all 
other sources of information should defer to the single source. This requires discipline and 
acceptance that no matter how much individuals may disagree, in this circumstance, it is 
necessary to present the consistent message. Confusion needs to be avoided at all costs and is 
much more likely to cause injury to patients and adversely impact ED staff.
 » Information should be provided in an organised and consistent format, regardless of the 
means of distribution. Multiple means are necessary, but a consistent message is vital. A 
simplified ‘state-of-the-art’ summary re-issued regularly, and published in juxtaposition with 
only the more recent updates, will promote communication both for those new to, and those 
experienced with, the progress of the pandemic event.
 » There is a need for active engagement and collaboration with the media and for clinicians to 
aid this process by disciplined approaches. A proper communication strategy is needed that 
reflects local engagement. However, this process must also take cognisance of the need for 
consistent information.
 » Standardised clinical approaches are critical. Guidelines need to be issued, and in the case 
of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza were found to be very useful. Standardised approaches 
to triage are necessary to ensure consistency in assessment. EDs need to review their 
management of infectious patients. Guidelines for managing infectious patients in EDs 
should be reviewed and include managing infectious patients in a pandemic.
 » Policies regarding the establishment of flu clinics should be in place and strategies 
determined for rapid implementation when an outbreak occurs. All services, including pre-
hospital services, should be engaged in the development and approval of these policies and 
strategies.
 » ED design should be reviewed to determine how to better accommodate infectious patients, 
during a pandemic and on an every-day basis.
 » ED infection control procedures, and the related behaviours of ED staff, in both normal and 
emergency situations, must be reviewed
 » There is a need to address a range of occupational health and safety issues including leave, 
immunisation, infection control, and entitlements to compensation.
 » Supplies required during a pandemic must be identified, and strategies designed to ensure 
access and availability. These include embedded stockpiles and dedicated stockpiles.
 » Standard policies for PPE and antiviral agents must be developed consistently applied.
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 » Strategies to create surge capacity within EDs for staff, equipment, physical space and stores, 
need to be identified.
 » Peer and local support strategies should be developed to ensure staff feel their needs are 
provided for, thereby creating resilience, dependability, and stability in the ED workforce. 
These strategies also need to identify mechanisms for peer support and need to address staff 
resilience and psychological first aid. 
 » Planning frameworks should be reviewed to clarify the relationship between pandemic plans 
and disaster plans. 
 » There is a need to recognise that EDs have limited capacity that is already overstretched 
by increasing demand and access block. We must tailor our expectations of their role in a 
pandemic to that reality.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations to this study some of which have been identified in the results 
and discussion.
ED experience is not representative of the total patient load. EDs, by their nature, tend to attract 
the more serious end of the health continuum. We remain unaware of the actual incidence of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza. Policy decisions stopped the testing of patients, as positive 
diagnosis did not change treatment or isolation. The data available to this study was largely 
restricted to public hospital EDs. The outcomes of this study will complement any broader patient 
descriptions arising from the survey of primary health care services.
The survey was conducted using a web-based survey instrument. This method of survey is efficient 
and protective of the privacy of the individual. However, it requires deliberate action by the 
individual to access the site and complete the survey. Despite numerous attempts at reminders and 
encouragement, the response rate was about 20% of those approached. This rate of response may 
not be representative of the majority. Individuals who access a survey may be more concerned and 
have points to make. They may also be more aware and engaged in broader policy matters and may 
not necessarily represent the majority.
The responses from the Directors of Emergency Medicine survey were disappointing and resulted 
in no quantification of data for analysis. The twelve directors who answered the quantitative 
elements of the survey did provide at least some information about the management of the 
departments during the pandemic that may help inform future policy.
Whilst it is possible that responses to the survey were not broadly representative, the research team 
have endeavoured, with the assistance of the ACEM, CENA, and the ACEN, to ensure maximum 
response to the survey and limit the potential of any biased representation in the results.
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Appendices
A: General staff survey quantitative data tables
Table A-1. Demographic characteristics of respondents and their hospitals
Characteristics
Hospital jurisdiction, no. (%) Total Registrar SMO Nurse
ACT 10 (2) 3 (2) 0 (0) 7 (4)
NSW 125 (25) 39 (22) 38 (25) 45 (27)
NT 13 (3) 6 (3) 4 (3) 3 (2)
QLD 99 (20) 40 (23) 25 (17) 34 (21)
SA 38 (8) 18 (10) 11 (7) 9 (5)
TAS 12 (2) 2 (1) 6 (4) 4 (2)
VIC 149 (30) 41 (23) 54 (34) 52 (32)
WA 53 (11) 27 (15) 15 (10) 10 (6)
Total 499 (100) 176 (100) 150 (100) 164 (100)
No answer 119 1 1 2
Hospital size, no. (%), beds
1–249 129 (28) 28 (18) 35 (24) 65 (41)
250–499 195 (42) 72 (46) 59 (41) 60 (38)
500–749 115 (25) 46 (29) 41 (29) 27 (17)
750+ 28 (6) 12 (8) 9 (6) 6 (4)
Total 467 (100) 158 (100) 144 (100) 158 (100)
Don't know 33 19 5 8
No answer 118 0 2 0
ACEM Emergency Department 
designation, no. (%)
Major Referral / Tertiary 225 (46) 86 (49) 74 (49) 62 (38)
Urban District / other Capital 
City
157 (32) 57 (33) 49 (33) 49 (30)
Major Regional / Rural Base 91 (18) 31 (18) 25 (17) 34 (21)
Rural Emergency Service 19 (4) 0 (0) 2 (1) 17 (10)
Primary Care/ Remote 
Emergency Service 
2 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1)
Total 494 (100) 175 (100) 150 (100) 163 (100)
Don’t know 7 2 1 2
No answer 117 0 0 1
Hospital type, no. (%)
Public 463 (93) 168 (95) 142 (95) 147 (90)
Private 13 (3) 1 (1) 3 (2) 8 (5)
Mixed 21 (4) 7 (4) 5 (3) 8 (5)
Total 497 (100) 176 (100) 150 (100) 163 (100)
No answer 121 1 1 3
Emergency Department role, 
no. (%)
Doctor 331 (66)    
Nurse 166 (33)    
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Characteristics
Other 2 (1)    
Total 499 (100)    
No answer 119    
Age, mean (SD), y 38.8 (8.09) 33.2 (4.43) 42.7 (6.26) 41.5 (9.18)
Age, median (IQR), y 38 (32–45) 32 (30–35) 42 (37–47) 41 (33–48)
Gender, no. (%)
Male 233 (48) 100 (57) 106 (72) 27 (17)
Female 250 (52) 75 (43) 41 (28) 134 (83)
Years since first professional 
qualification, mean (SD)
14.2 (8.55) 7.86 (3.65) 17.9 (6.82) 17.9 (9.67)
Years since first professional 
qualification, median (IQR)
12 (7–20) 7 (5–10) 17 (12–20) 17 (10–25)
Years of ED experience, mean 
(SD)
9.6 (6.59) 4.5 (2.38) 13.7 (5.84) 11.5 (6.74)
Years of ED experience, median 
(IQR)
8 (4–14) 4 (3–7) 12 (10–17) 10 (6–16)
Hours typically worked in ED, 
mean (SD)
37.1 (9.90) 39.0 (7.88) 36.5 (9.90) 35.6 (11.50)
Hours typically worked in ED, 
median (IQR)
40 (32–40) 40 (38–40) 40 (32–40) 38 (30–40)
Table A-2. Role and qualifications of doctor and nurse respondents
Position—Doctors, no. (%) Registrar SMO
Registrar 177 (54)   
Senior Medical Officer/Staff Specialist 151 (46)
Administrative role—Doctors, no. (%)
Yes 37 (11) 5 (3) 32 (21)
No 290 (89) 170 (97) 119 (79)
Highest qualification level—Doctors, no. (%)
Bachelor Degree 212 (66) 132 (75) 80 (55)
Graduate Certificate/Graduate Diploma 50 (16) 22 (13) 27 (19)
Masters 36 (11) 14 (8) 22 (15)
Doctorate 24 (7) 7 (4) 17 (12)
Position—Nurses, no. (%)
DON/ND/ADON 3 (2)   
NP 12 (7)   
NUM/NM/CNC/CNM 32 (20)   
Educator/Researcher or equivalent 12 (7)   
CN/CNS/CF/CNE 67 (42)   
RN 35 (22)   
Highest qualification level—Nurses, no. (%)
Hospital Certificate 6 (4)   
Bachelor Degree 22 (15)   
Graduate Certificate/Graduate Diploma 78 (54)   
Masters 37 (26)   
Doctorate 2 (1)   
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Table A-3. Preparedness of Emergency Department for the Pandemic (H1N1) 
Outbreak
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Not at all 
prepared
34 (6) 9 (5) 11 (7) 11 (7)  
2 152 (25) 28 (16) 52 (35) 40 (24)  
3 184 (30) 50 (29) 37 (25) 61 (37) 0.003
4 166 (27) 59 (35) 38 (25) 37 (22)  
5 Well prepared 70 (12) 25 (15) 12 (8) 17 (10)  
Total 606 (100) 171 (100) 150 (100) 166 (100)  
Can’t rate 9 4 1 0  
No Answer 3 2 0 0  
Response, 
mean (SD)
3.14 (1.09) 3.37 (1.08) 2.92 (1.10) 3.05 (1.07) 0.001
Question: How prepared would you say your Emergency Department was to deal with the 
challenges presented by the H1N1 pandemic?
Table A-4. How much extra demand from H1N1 pandemic
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 No increased 
demand
6 (1) 2 (1) 3 (2) 0 (0)
2 11 (2) 2 (1) 2 (1) 6 (4)  
3 51 (9) 11 (7) 19 (13) 8 (5) 0.009
4 217 (36) 71 (42) 55 (37) 49 (30)  
5 Greatly 
increased 
demand
314 (52) 82 (49) 70 (47) 102 (62)  
Total 599 (100) 168 (100) 149 (100) 165 (100)  
Can’t rate 15 7 2 1  
No Answer 4 2 0 0  
Response, 
mean (SD)
4.37 (0.80) 4.36 (0.76) 4.26 (0.88) 4.50 (0.75) 0.03
Question: Please recall the period earlier this year when the presentations for ILI and H1N1 were at 
their peak in your ED. In your opinion, how much extra demand did the H1N1 pandemic create for 
your ED when compared with a similar time of year?
Table A-5. Mix of influenza cases in terms of severity of illness
‘Worried well’ people concerned about exposure
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Very low % 12 (2) 2 (1) 6 (4) 3 (2)  
2 Low % 34 (6) 7 (4) 14 (9) 8 (5)  
3 Medium % 113 (19) 45 (26) 26 (17) 27 (16) 0.08
4 High % 271 (45) 67 (39) 65 (44) 78 (47)  
5 Very high % 176 (29) 54 (30) 38 (26) 52 (31)  
Total 606 (100) 174 (100) 149 (100) 165 (100)  
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
A-4
Not Applicable 1 0 0 0  
Don’t know 7 2 1 1  
No answer 4 1 1 0  
Response, 
mean (SD)
3.93 (0.94) 3.93 (0.91) 3.77 (1.06) 4.00 (0.92) 0.1
People needing simple supportive measures
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Very low % 9 (2) 1 (1) 5 (3) 3 (2)  
2 Low % 78 (13) 19 (11) 28 (19) 13 (8)  
3 Medium % 211 (35) 65 (38) 52 (35) 52 (32) 0.05
4 High % 237 (39) 72 (42) 51 (34) 73 (45)  
5 Very high % 67 (11) 16 (9) 13 (9) 21 (13)  
Total 602 (100) 173 (100) 149 (100) 162 (100)  
Not applicable 2 0 0 1  
Don’t know 8 2 2 1  
No answer 6 2 0 2  
Response, 
mean (SD)
3.46 (0.91) 3.48 (0.83) 3.26 (0.98) 3.59 (0.88) 0.005
Moderately ill people
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Very low % 63 (10) 20 (12) 23 (15) 9 (5)  
2 Low % 256 (42) 70 (40) 72 (48) 65 (40)  
3 Medium % 226 (37) 68 (39) 41 (28) 73 (45) 0.03
4 High % 49 (8) 13 (7) 12 (8) 13 (8)  
5 Very high % 10 (2) 3 (2) 1 (1) 4 (2)  
Total 604 (100) 174 (100) 149 (100) 164 (100)  
Not applicable 1 0 0 0  
Don’t know 7 2 1 1  
No answer 6 1 1   
Response, 
mean (SD)
2.48 (0.85) 2.48 (0.86) 2.30 (0.85) 2.62 (0.81) 0.004
Critically ill people
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Very low % 307 (52) 89 (52) 93 (63) 70 (43)  
2 Low % 195 (33) 58 (34) 39 (26) 61 (37)  
3 Medium % 67 (11) 16 (9) 13 (9) 20 (12) 0.06
4 High % 21 (4) 5 (3) 3 (2) 7 (4)  
5 Very high % 3 (1) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Total 593 (100) 170 (100) 148 (100) 158 (100)  
Not applicable 9 2 0 5  
Don’t know 10 4 2 1  
No answer 6 1 1 2  
Response, 
mean (SD)
1.68 (0.85) 1.66 (0.86) 1.50 (0.74) 1.77 (0.84) 0.01
Question: Please recall the period earlier this year when the presentations for ILI and H1N1 were at 
their peak in your ED. In your opinion, how much extra demand did the H1N1 pandemic create for 
your ED when compared with a similar time of year?
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Table A-6. Impact of H1N1 pandemic on the care of other ED patients
Response, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 No impact 22 (4) 4 (2) 6 (4) 7 (4)  
2 93 (15) 30 (17) 25 (17) 20 (12)  
3 193 (32) 65 (38) 44 (29) 50 (30) 0.54
4 232 (39) 58 (34) 58 (39) 70 (42)  
5 Severe impact 63 (10) 16 (9) 17 (11) 17 (10)  
Total 603 (100) 173 (100) 150 (100) 164 (100)  
Can’t rate 11 3 1 1  
No answer 4 1 0 1  
Response, 
mean (SD)
3.37 (0.99) 3.30 (0.94) 3.37 (1.02) 3.43 (0.98) 0.50
Question: At the peak of the pandemic in your ED, what impact (if any) did the H1N1  pandemic 
have on the care of other patients, that is those without ILI or H1N1  infection?
Table A-7. Characteristics of information received about the H1N1 pandemic
Useful to your 
work
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Not at all 7 (1) 1 (1) 5 (3) 0 (0)  
2 Seldom 40 (7) 8 (5) 20 (13) 9 (6)  
3 About half the 
time
144 (26) 39 (22) 42 (28) 45 (28) <.001
4 Usually 263 (48) 84 (48) 73 (49) 74 (45)  
5 Always 97 (18) 43 (25) 10 (7) 35 (21)  
Total 551 
(100) 175 (100) 150 (100) 163 (100)  
Can’t rate 3 2 0 0  
No answer 64 0 1 3  
Useful to your 
work, mean 
(SD)
3.73 (0.88) 3.91 (0.84) 3.42 (0.92) 3.83 (0.83) <.001
Sufficient in 
coverage, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Not at all 8 (1) 2 (1) 4 (3) 1 (1)  
2 Seldom 50 (9) 12 (7) 20 (14) 13 (8)  
3 About half the 
time
164 (30) 49 (29) 38 (26) 55 (33) 0.003
4 Usually 271 (50) 83 (49) 83 (56) 75 (46)  
5 Always 52 (10) 24 (14) 3 (2) 20 (12)  
Total 545 (100) 170 (100) 148 (100) 164 (100)  
Can’t rate 5 3 1 0  
No answer 68 4 2 2  
Sufficient in 
coverage, mean 
(SD)
3.57 ((0.84) 3.68 (0.85) 3.41 (0.85) 3.61 (0.83) 0.02
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Consistent, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Not at all 37 (7) 9 (5) 16 (11) 7 (4)  
2 Seldom 86 (16) 28 (16) 23 (15) 26 (16)  
3 About half the 
time
167 (30) 47 (27) 39 (26) 59 (36) 0.07
4 Usually 218 (40) 79 (46) 64 (43) 56 (34)  
5 Always 29 (7) 10 (6) 7 (5) 15 (9)  
Total 547 (100) 173 (100) 149 (100) 163 (100)  
Can’t rate 6 3 1 0  
No answer 65 1 1 3  
Consistent, 
mean (SD)
3.25 (1.03) 3.31 (0.99) 3.15 (1.09) 3.28 (0.99) 0.37
Question: Please recall all of the information provided to you at work regarding the H1N1 
pandemic. To what degree did you find this information:
Table A-8. Pandemic plans
A. Pandemic 
plan exist, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
Yes, as part of 
hospital plan
165 (30) 32 (18) 55 (36) 58 (35)  
Yes, stand-alone 
ED plan
50 (9) 13 (7) 6 (4) 24 (15)  
No 103 (18) 21 (12) 41 (27) 28 (17) <0.001
Don’t know 239 (43) 109 (62) 49 (33) 56 (34)  
Total 557 (100) 175 (100) 151 (100) 166 (100)  
No answer 61 2 0 0  
B. Pandemic 
plan activateda, 
no. (%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse
Yes 141 (66) 31 (69) 37 (62) 58 (71)  
No 41 (19) 3 (7) 17 (28) 15 (18) 0.02
Don’t know 32 (15) 11 (24) 6 (10) 9 (11)  
Total 214 (100) 45 (100) 60 (100) 82 (100)  
No answer 1 0 1 0  
C. Pandemic 
plan—how 
usefulb, no. (%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse
1 Not at all 
useful
3 (2) 0 (0) 2 (5) 1 (2)  
2 20 (14) 3 (10) 7 (19) 8 (14)  
3 37 (28) 7 (23) 7 19) 17 (30) 0.72
4 47 (34) 13 (42) 13 (35) 17 (30)  
5 Very useful 30 (22) 8 (26) 8 (22) 13 (23)  
Total 137 (100) 31 (100) 37 (100) 56 (100)  
Can’t rate 1 0 0 1  
No answer 3 0 0 1  
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Pandemic 
plan—how 
useful, mean 
(SD)
3.59 (1.05) 3.84 (0.93) 3.49 (1.19) 3.59 (1.06) 0.39
aQuestion asked only of those indicating “yes” to question A.
bQuestion only asked of those answering “yes” to question B.
Questions: 
A. Was there a written Pandemic Plan for your ED before the H1N1 pandemic earlier this year, that 
is before May 2009?
B. Was this Pandemic Plan activated during the H1N1 pandemic?
C. How useful was this Pandemic Plan in dealing with the H1N1 pandemic?
Table A-9. Effect of H1N1 pandemic on ED staff stress level
A. Own stress 
level, no. (%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 No increased 
stress
31 (6) 10 (6) 12 (8) 7 (4)  
2 85 (16) 30 (18) 28 (19) 22 (13)  
3 135 (26) 59 (35) 31 (21) 35 (21) 0.002
4 175 (34) 52 (31) 54 (36) 56 (34)  
5 Greatly 
increased stress
92 (18) 19 (11) 23 (16) 44 (27)  
Total 518 (100) 170 (100) 148 (100) 164 (100)  
Can’t rate 5 2 1 0  
No answer 95 5 2 2  
Own stress 
level, mean 
(SD)
3.41 (1.13) 3.24 (1.06) 3.32 (1.19) 3.66 (1.14) 0.002
B1. Increased 
demand on 
your ED, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
20 (4) 5 (3) 8 (5) 6 (4)  
2 39 (7) 14 (8) 15 (10) 9 (5)  
3 79 (15) 27 (16) 27 (18) 18 (11) 0.34
4 170 (32) 60 (34) 44 (29) 54 (33)  
5 Highly 
significant
217 (41) 68 (39) 56 (37) 78 (47)  
Total 525 (100) 174 (100) 150 (100) 165 (100)  
Not applicable 0 0 0 0  
Can’t rate 6 1 1 1  
No answer 87 2 0 0  
Increased 
demand on 
your ED, mean 
(SD)
4.00 (1.10) 3.99 (1.06) 3.83 (1.19) 4.15 (1.06) 0.04
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B2. Patient 
or family 
aggression, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
102 (20) 29 (17) 47 (31) 21 (13)  
2 118 (23) 43 (25) 39 (26) 29 (18)  
3 110 (21) 47 (27) 26 (17) 30 (18) <.001
4 138 (26) 35 (20) 31 (21) 60 (37)  
5 Highly 
significant
54 (10) 18 (11) 7 (5) 22 (14)  
Total 522 (100) 172 (100) 150 (100) 162 (100)  
Not applicable 3 1 0 2  
Can’t rate 7 3 1 1  
No answer 86 1 0 1  
Patient 
or family 
aggression, 
mean (SD)
2.85 (1.29) 2.83 (1.24) 2.41 (1.25) 3.20 (1.26) <.001
B3. Access 
block to ICU, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
88 (18) 20 (12) 29 (20) 31 (21)  
2 114 (23) 49 (29) 31 (21) 29 (20)  
3 118 (24) 39 (23) 31 (21) 41 (28) 0.18
4 87 (18) 28 (17) 25 (17) 25 (17)  
5 Highly 
significant
90 (18) 31 (19) 31 (21) 21 (14)  
Total 497 (100) 167 (100) 147 (100) 147 (100)  
Not applicable 14 3 2 9  
Can’t rate 18 5 2 8  
No answer 89 2 0 2  
Access block to 
ICU, mean (SD)
2.95 (1.36) 3.01 (1.30) 2.99 (1.42) 2.84 (1.33) 0.49
B4. Access 
block (to 
other hospital 
wards), no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
39 (8) 5 (3) 16 (11) 15 (10)  
2 63 (12) 26 (15) 21 (14) 14 (9)  
3 87 (17) 37 (22) 20 (14) 22 (14) 0.02
4 149 (29) 54 (32) 36 (25) 45 (29)  
5 Highly 
significant
170 (34) 48 (28) 54 (37) 58 (38)  
Total 508 (100) 170 (100) 147 (100) 154 (100)  
Not applicable 7 3 0 4  
Can’t rate 12 3 2 4  
No answer 91 1 2 4  
Access block to 
other hospital 
wards, mean 
(SD)
3.69 (1.26) 3.67 (1.12) 3.62 (1.39) 3.76 (1.31) 0.62
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
A-9
B5. Lack of 
space for 
patients in the 
ED, no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
22 (4) 5 (3) 11 (7) 5 (3)  
2 30 (6) 13 (8) 9 (6) 8 (5)  
3 54 (10) 23 (13) 12 (8) 11 (7) 0.01
4 130 (25) 54 (31) 34 (23) 33 (20)  
5 Highly 
significant
288 (55) 79 (46) 84 (56) 106 (65)  
Total 524 (100) 173 (100) 150 (100) 163 (100)  
Not applicable 2 1 0 1  
Can’t rate 6 1 1 2  
No answer 86 2 0 0  
Lack of space 
for patients in 
the ED, mean 
(SD)
4.21 (1.10) 4.09 (1.07) 4.14 (1.24) 4.39 (1.02) 0.03
B6. Lack of 
supplies or 
equipment, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
97 (19) 29 (23) 31 (21) 22 (13)  
2 110 (21) 36 (21) 42 (28) 22 (13)  
3 120 (23) 41 (24) 35 (23) 38 (23) 0.002
4 111 (21) 33 (19) 22 (15) 46 (28)  
5 Highly 
significant
86 (16) 23 (13) 20 (13) 37 (22)  
Total 524 (100) 172 (100) 150 (100) 165 (100)  
Not applicable 1 1 0 0  
Can’t rate 6 2 1 0  
No answer 87 2 0 1  
Lack of supplies 
or equipment, 
mean (SD)
2.96 (1.35) 2.80 (1.35) 2.72 (1.31) 3.33 (1.32) <.001
B7. Lack of 
medications or 
treatments, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
131 (25) 52 (31) 42 (28) 31 (19)  
2 158 (30) 54 (31) 46 (31) 48 (29)  
3 110 (21) 31 (18) 29 (19) 41 (25) 0.12
4 79 (15) 20 (12) 27 (18) 28 (17)  
5 Highly 
significant
42 (8) 15 (9) 6 (4) 15 (9)  
Total 520 (100) 170 (100) 150 (100) 163 (100)  
Not applicable 2 1 0 1  
Can’t rate 6 2 1 0  
No answer 90 4 0 2  
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Lack of 
medications 
or treatments, 
mean (SD)
2.51 (1.24) 2.38 (1.27) 2.39 (1.19) 2.68 (1.23) 0.04
B8. Staff 
absenteeism, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
54 (10) 14 (8) 17 (11) 19 (12)  
2 94 (18) 30 (17) 24 (16) 33 (20)  
3 116 (22) 40 (23) 34 (23) 37 (23) 0.79
4 135 (26) 42 (24) 41 (28) 41 (26)  
5 Highly 
significant
118 (23) 46 (27) 32 (22) 31 (19)  
Total 517 (100) 172 (100) 148 (100) 161 (100)  
Not applicable 2 0 0 1  
Can’t rate 13 4 3 4  
No answer 86 1 0 0  
Staff 
absenteeism, 
mean (SD)
3.33 (1.29) 3.44 (1.28) 3.32 (1.29) 3.20 (1.29) 0.23
B9. Filling staff 
deficits, no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
61 (13) 20 (13) 15 (10) 22 (14)  
2 84 (17) 27 (18) 26 (18) 25 (16)  
3 95 (20) 32 (21) 27 (19) 32 (21) 0.90
4 114 (24) 29 (19) 39 (27) 35 (23)  
5 Highly 
significant
128 (27) 42 (28) 37 (26) 41 (26)  
Total 482 (100) 150 (100) 144 (100) 155 (100)  
Not applicable 11 4 3 3  
Can’t rate 33 19 3 7  
No answer 92 4 1 1  
Filling staff 
deficits, mean 
(SD)
3.34 (1.37) 3.31 (1.40) 3.40 (1.32) 3.31 (1.39) 0.82
B10. 
Redeployment 
of at-risk staff, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
105 (23) 29 (22) 35 (25) 36 (25)  
2 126 (28) 33 (24) 39 (28) 44 (31)  
3 97 (22) 34 (25) 27 (19) 30 (21) 0.56
4 64 (14) 16 (12) 23 (17) 16 (11)  
5 Highly 
significant
58 (13) 23 (17) 15 (11) 17 (12)  
Total 450 (100) 135 (100) 139 (100) 143 (100)  
Not applicable 27 12 5 8  
Can’t rate 51 26 7 15  
No answer 90 4 0 0  
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Redeployment 
of at-risk staff, 
mean (SD)
2.65 (1.33) 2.79 (1.37) 2.60 (1.32) 2.54 (1.30) 0.28
B11. Falling 
below 
minimum 
skill mix 
requirements, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
98 (21) 37 (27) 31 (22) 24 (16)  
2 123 (27) 40 (29) 47 (34) 27 (18)  
3 93 (20) 28 (20) 25 (18) 35 (23) <.001
4 80 (17) 22 (16) 18 (13) 31 (21)  
5 Highly 
significant
69 (15) 11 (8) 19 (14) 34 (23)  
Total 463 (100) 138 (100) 140 (100) 151 (100)  
Not applicable 14 10 0 4  
Can’t rate 46 27 9 7  
No answer 95 2 2 4  
Falling below 
minimum 
skill mix 
requirements, 
mean (SD)
2.78 (1.36) 2.49 (1.26) 2.62 (1.33) 3.16 (1.38) <.001
B12. Being 
asked to work 
extra shifts, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
162 (33) 55 (34) 54 (39) 46 (29)  
2 105 (21) 36 (22) 34 (25) 28 (18)  
3 83 (17) 30 (18) 22 (16) 24 (15) 0.06
4 94 (19) 29 (18) 19 (14) 35 (22)  
5 Highly 
significant
52 (10) 14 (9) 9 (7) 26 (16)  
Total 496 (100) 164 (100) 138 (100) 159 (100)  
Not applicable 23 7 9 5  
Can’t rate 8 3 2 1  
No answer 91 2 2 1  
Being asked 
to work extra 
shifts, mean 
(SD)
2.53 (1.38) 2.46 (1.34) 2.24 (1.28) 2.79 (1.48) 0.002
B13. Being 
asked to 
work outside 
your level of 
expertise, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
237 (50) 74 (47) 74 (52) 77 (52)  
2 132 (28) 46 (29) 35 (25) 42 (28)  
3 49 (10) 18 (12) 13 (9) 15 (10) 0.89
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4 39 (8) 13 (8) 11 (8) 7 (5)  
5 Highly 
significant
21 (4) 6 (4) 8 (6) 7 (5)  
Total 478 (100) 157 (100) 141 (100) 148 (100)  
Not applicable 41 14 9 14  
Can’t rate 9 2 1 3  
No answer 90 3 0 1  
Being asked to 
work outside 
your level of 
expertise, 
mean (SD)
1.90 (1.15) 1.92 (1.12) 1.89 (1.20) 1.82 (1.10) 0.71
B14. Being 
asked to staff 
a flu clinic, no. 
(%)
1 Not at all 
significant
174 (41) 63 (47) 46 (38) 52 (39)  
2 77 (18) 25 (19) 23 (19) 24 (18)  
3 53 (13) 15 (11) 17 (14) 19 (14) 0.71
4 54 (13) 16 (12) 12 (10) 18 (14)  
5 Highly 
significant
65 (15) 16 (12) 24 (20) 20 (15)  
Total 423 (100) 135 (100) 122 (100) 133 (100)  
Not applicable 70 22 23 21  
Can’t rate 34 18 5 9  
No answer 91 2 1 3  
Being asked 
to staff a flu 
clinic, mean 
(SD)
2.41 (1.50) 2.24 (1.44) 2.55 (1.55) 2.47 (1.49) 0.21
B15. Concern 
about 
becoming ill 
with H1N1 
(2009) no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
141 (27) 40 (23) 48 (32) 49 (30)  
2 143 (27) 53 (31) 34 (23) 47 (29)  
3 86 (17) 23 (13) 31 (21) 26 (16) 0.26
4 74 (14) 28 (16) 16 (11) 19 (12)  
5 Highly 
significant
77 (15) 28 (16) 20 (13) 22 (13)  
Total 521 (100) 172 (100) 149 (100) 163 (100)  
Not applicable 3 2 0 0  
Can’t rate 4 1 1 1  
No answer 90 2 1 2  
Concern about 
becoming 
ill with 
H1N1(2009), 
mean (SD)
2.62 (1.40) 2.72 (1.41) 2.50 (1.39) 2.50 (1.38) 0.27
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B16. Concern 
about exposing 
family 
members to 
H1N1 (2009), 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
significant
126 (25) 44 (27) 37 (26) 40 (26)  
2 108 (21) 36 (22) 30 (21) 35 (23)  
3 85 (17) 24 (15) 29 (20) 27 (17) 0.95
4 73 (15) 25 (16) 21 (15) 19 (12)  
5 Highly 
significant
104 (21) 32 (20) 26 (18) 35 (23)  
Total 496 (100) 161 (100) 143 (100) 156 (100)  
Not applicable 16 8 3 4  
Can’t rate 6 1 2 1  
No answer 100 7 3 5  
Concern about 
exposing 
family 
members to 
H1N1 (2009) 
mean (SD)
2.84 (1.48) 2.78 (1.50) 2.78 (1.44) 2.83 (1.48) 0.94
Questions:  
A. To what extent did the H1N1 pandemic increase your own stress level at work when compared to 
normal for this time of year?
B. How significant were each of the following factors to your own stress level at work during the 
H1N1 pandemic?
Table A-10. Deployment and ease of use of preventive measures to protect 
staff from H1N1 (2009) infection
Antivirals, used 
in ED, no. (%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
Yes 179 (36) 61 (35) 52 (35) 60 (38)
No 287 (57) 97 (56) 96 (64) 84 (53) 0.02
Don’t know 33 (7) 16 (9) 2 (1) 14 (9)  
Total 499 (100) 174 (100) 150 (100) 158 (100)  
No answer 119 3 1 8  
Surgical masks, 
used in ED, no. 
(%)
Yes 439 (87) 156 (90) 125 (83) 142 (87)
No 65 (13) 16 (9) 26 (17) 22 (13) 0.18
Don’t know 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Total 505 (100) 173 (100) 151 (100) 164 (100)  
No answer 113 4 0 2  
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N95 or P2 
respirators, 
used in ED, no. 
(%)
Yes 416 (82) 131 (75) 128 (85) 141 (87)
No 61 (12) 22 (13) 21 (14) 18 (11) <.001
Don’t know 29 (6) 22 (13) 2 (1) 4 (2)  
Total 506 (100) 175 (100) 151 (100) 163 (100)  
No answer 112 2 0 3  
Alcohol based 
hand rubs, 
used in ED, no. 
(%)
Yes 495 (98) 175 (100) 144 (96) 159 (99)
No 5 (1) 0 (0) 4 (3) 1 (1) 0.08
Don’t know 3 (1) 0 (0) 2 (1) 1 (1)  
Total 503 (100) 175 (100) 150 (100) 161 (100)  
No answer 115 2 1 5  
Antivirals, ease 
of use, no. (%)
1 Very easy to 
use
43 (22) 14 (20) 8 (14) 20 (33)  
2 Easy to use 84 (43) 33 (46) 27 (47) 22 (37)  
3 Neither easy 
nor difficult to 
use
54 (28) 21 (30) 15 (26) 16 (27) 0.18
4 Difficult to use 10 (5) 2 (3) 5 (9) 2 (3)  
5 Very difficult 
to use
3 (2) 1 (1) 2 (4) 0 (0)  
Total 194 (100) 71 (100) 57 (100) 60 (100)  
Not applicable 119 40 47 28  
Can’t rate 43 11 7 25  
No answer 262 55 40 53  
Antivirals, ease 
of use, mean 
(SD)
2.21 (0.90) 2.20 (0.84) 2.40 (0.96) 2.00 (0.86) 0.05
Surgical masks, 
ease of use, no. 
(%)
1 Very easy to 
use
180 (44) 67 (46) 38 (33) 68 (50)  
2 Easy to use 175 (42) 61 (41) 57 (49) 52 (38)  
3 Neither easy 
nor difficult to 
use
41 (10) 16 (11) 12 (10) 12 (9) 0.05
4 Difficult to use 15 (4) 3 (2) 9 (8) 3 (2)  
5 Very difficult 
to use
1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1)  
Total 412 (100) 147 (100) 116 (100) 136 (100)  
Not applicable 26 3 10 12  
Can’t rate 11 3 5 3  
No answer 169 24 20 15  
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Surgical masks, 
ease of use, 
mean (SD)
1.74 (0.80) 1.69 (0.75) 1.93 (0.86) 1.65 (0.79) 0.01
N95 or P2 
respirators, 
ease of use, no. 
(%)
1 Very easy to 
use
108 (27) 31 (25) 18 (15) 56 (40)  
2 Easy to use 161 (41) 52 (42) 57 (48) 48 (35)  
3 Neither easy 
nor difficult to 
use
64 (16) 24 (19) 21 (18) 18 (13) <.001
4 Difficult to use 52 (13) 14 (11) 23 (19) 11 (8)  
5 Very difficult 
to use
10 (3) 3 (2) 1 (1) 5 (4)  
Total 395 (100) 124 (100) 120 (100) 138 (100)  
Not applicable 28 12 10 5  
Can’t rate 22 10 4 8  
No answer 173 31 17 15  
N95 or P2 
respirators, 
ease of use, 
mean (SD)
2.23 (1.07) 2.24 (1.03) 2.43 (0.99) 1.99 (1.09) 0.003
Alcohol-based 
hand rubs, ease 
of use, no. (%)
1 Very easy to 
use
353 (75) 127 (77) 80 (59) 133 (85)  
2 Easy to use 102 (22) 34 (21) 48 (35) 18 (12)  
3 Neither easy 
nor difficult to 
use
10 (2) 3 (2) 5 (4) 2 (1) <0.001
4 Difficult to use 5 (1) 1 (1) 2 (1) 2 (1)  
5 Very difficult 
to use
2 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1)  
Total 472 (100) 165 (100) 136 (100) 156 (100)  
Not applicable 1 0 1 0  
No answer 145 12 14 10  
Alcohol-based 
hand rubs, ease 
of use, mean 
(SD)
1.31 (0.61) 1.26 (0.52) 1.50 (0.71) 1.21 (0.59) <0.001
Question: What preventive measures were deployed by your department to protect staff from 
H1N1 infection and how easy was each measure to use?
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Table A-11. How supportive were different groups of ED staff’s needs during 
the H1N1 pandemic
ED 
administration, 
no. (%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
1 Not at all 
supportive
15 (3) 5 (3) 5 (4) 4 (2)  
2 47 (10) 17 (10) 9 (6) 20 (13)  
3 89 (18) 38 (23) 23 (16) 24 (15) 0.29
4 129 (27) 45 (27) 36 (25) 42 (27)  
5 Highly 
supportive
200 (42) 59 (36) 59 (49) 68 (43)  
Total 480 (100) 164 (100) 142 (100) 158 (100)  
Not applicable 8 2 5 1  
Can’t rate 20 9 4 7  
No answer 110 2 0 0  
ED 
administration, 
mean (SD)
3.94 (1.13) 3.83 (1.12) 4.09 (1.10) 3.95 (1.15) 0.13
ED colleagues, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
3 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1)  
2 8 (2) 3 (2) 2 (1) 2 (1)  
3 56 (11) 31 (18) 8 (5) 14 (9) 0.02
4 188 (38) 68 (40) 55 (37) 59 (36)  
5 Highly 
supportive
245 (49) 68 (40) 83 (56) 88 (54)  
Total 500 (100) 171 (100) 149 (100) 164 (100)  
Not applicable 3 0 1 2  
Can’t rate 5 4 1 0  
No answer 110 2 0 0  
ED colleagues, 
mean (SD)
4.33 (0.78) 4.16 (0.82) 4.46 (0.72) 4.41 (0.75) 0.001
Hospital 
administration, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
56 (12) 16 (11) 22 (15) 17 (11)  
2 108 (23) 33 (22) 33 (23) 39 (24)  
3 127 (27) 47 (31) 37 (25) 36 (23) 0.63
4 111 (24) 34 (22) 37 (25) 39 (24)  
5 Highly 
supportive
68 (14) 22 (14) 17 (12) 28 (18)  
Total 470 (100) 152 (100) 146 (100) 159 (100)  
Not applicable 5 2 2 0  
Can’t rate 32 21 3 6  
No answer 111 2 0 1  
Hospital 
administration, 
mean (SD)
3.06 (1.23) 3.09 (1.20) 2.96 (1.25) 3.14 (1.27) 0.44
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Hospital 
occupational 
health 
department, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
41 (10) 9 (7) 23 (17) 8 (6)  
2 93 (22) 23 (17) 39 (29) 29 (20)  
3 118 (28) 45 (33) 29 (21) 39 (27) <.001
4 104 (24) 38 (28) 35 (26) 29 (20)  
5 Highly 
supportive
72 (17) 22 (16) 11 (8) 38 (27)  
Total 428 (100) 137 (100) 137 (100) 143 (100)  
Not applicable 21 8 4 7  
Can’t rate 57 29 10 16  
No answer 112 3 0 0  
Hospital staff 
health dept, 
mean (SD)
3.17 (1.22) 3.30 (1.13) 2.80 (1.23) 3.42 (1.24) <.001
State health 
department, 
no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
60 (13) 16 (11) 32 (22) 10 (7)  
2 113 (25) 29 (20) 52 (36) 31 (21)  
3 140 (31) 50 (34) 35 (24) 49 (33) <.001
4 95 (21) 37 (25) 18 (13) 36 (25)  
5 Highly 
supportive
43 (10) 14 (10) 7 (5) 21 (14)  
Total 451 (100) 146 (100) 144 (100) 147 (100)  
Not applicable 8 3 1 3  
Can’t rate 47 25 5 16  
No answer 112 3 1 0  
State health 
department, 
mean (SD)
2.88 (1.17) 3.03 (1.13) 2.42 (1.11) 3.18 (1.13) <.001
Professional 
college, no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
48 (14) 13 (12) 15 (12) 20 (20)  
2 66 (19) 14 (12) 29 (23) 22 (22)  
3 113 (33) 42 (27) 49 (39) 19 (19) 0.004
4 80 (23) 26 (23) 25 (20) 26 (27)  
5 Highly 
supportive
37 (11) 18 (16) 7 (6) 11 (11)  
Total 344 (100) 113 (100) 125 (100) 98 (100)  
Not applicable 41 12 8 19  
Can’t rate 122 50 17 49  
No answer 111 2 1 0  
Professional 
college, mean 
(SD)
2.98 (1.19) 3.19 (1.19) 2.84 (1.06) 2.86 (1.32) 0.04
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Union, no. (%)
1 Not at all 
supportive
75 (30) 24 (33) 21 (27) 28 (31)  
2 57 (23) 12 (16) 19 (24) 24 (27)  
3 59 (24) 23 (32) 18 (23) 17 (19) 0.30
4 37 (15) 7 (10) 16 (21) 12 (14)  
5 Highly 
supportive
19 (8) 7 (10) 4 (5) 8 (9)  
Total 247 (100) 73 (100) 125 (100) 89 (100)  
Not applicable 102 40 38 21  
Can’t rate 156 62 33 55  
No answer 113 2 2 1  
Union, mean 
(SD)
2.47 (1.27) 2.47 (1.30) 2.53 (1.24) 2.42 (1.30) 0.86
Question: How supportive did you find each of the following to be towards your needs and 
concerns as an ED staff member during the H1N1 pandemic?
Table A-12. ED staff illness during the H1N1 pandemic
A. Become ill 
with Influenza 
Like Illness, no. 
(%)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P Value
Yes 187 (37) 79 (45) 55 (37) 43 (26)  
No 319 (63) 95 (55) 92 (63) 122 (74) 0.001
Total 506 (100) 174 (100) 147 (100) 165 (100)  
No answer 112 3 4 1  
B. Tested for 
H1N1 (2009) no. 
(%)
Yes, tested and 
confirmed H1N1
12 (7) 9 (12) 2 (4) 1 (2)  
Yes, tested and 
no H1N1
12 (7) 4 (5) 4 (7) 2 (5) 0.23
No, not tested 155 (87) 62 (83) 48 (89) 40 (93)  
Total 179 (100) 75 (100) 54 (100) 43 (100)  
No answer 439 4 1 0  
C. Days of work 
missed because 
of ILI, no. (%)
0 days 79 (43) 32 (41) 35 (64) 9 (21)  
1–5 days 89 (49) 42 (54) 17 (31) 26 (62) 0.001
6–10 days 13 (7) 4 (5) 2 (4) 7 (17)  
11 + days 1 (1) 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0)  
Total 182 (100) 78 (100) 55 (100) 42 (100)  
No answer 436 1 0 1  
Days of work 
missed, all, 
mean (SD)
2.11 (3.30) 1.73 (2.03) 1.71 (4.82) 3.38 (2.59) 0.02
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Days of wk 
missed, if more 
than zero, 
mean (SD)
3.73 (3.63) 2.93 (1.85) 4.70 (7.15) 4.30 (2.13) 0.12
Questions: 
A. Did you become ill with an Influenza Like Illness (ILI) during the H1N1 pandemic (May 
through September 2009)?
B. Were you tested for the H1N1 virus? What was the outcome?
C. How many days of work did you miss because of your H1N1 or Influenza Like Illness?
Table A-13. ED staff caring for others (outside of work) with ILI during H1N1 
pandemic
A. Cared for 
during H1N1 
pandemic, no. 
(% of total)a
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
No one 297 (59) 110 (62) 83 (55) 101 (61)  
Family members 
living with
149 (30) 44 (25) 52 (34) 56 (32)  
Family members 
not living with
40 (8) 17 (10) 12 (8) 11 (7)  
Friends, 
neighbours, 
dependents
32 (6) 15 (8) 8 (5) 9 (5)  
Others 6 (1) 2 (1) 3 (2) 1 (1)  
B. Days of work 
missed caring 
for othersb, no. 
(%)
0 days 163 (83) 52 (81) 56 (88) 52 (79)  
1–5 days 30 (15) 12 (19) 7 (11) 11 (17) 0.15
6–10 days 3 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (4)  
11 + days 1 (0.5) 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0)  
Total 197 (100) 64 (100) 64 (100) 66 (100)  
Days of work 
missed, all, 
mean (SD)
0.50 (1.64) 0.37 (0.93) 0.41 (1.93) 0.74 (1.88) 0.37
Days of work 
missed, if more 
than zero, 
mean (SD)
2.91 (2.95) 2.00 (1.21) 3.25 (4.77) 3.5 (2.71) 0.42
aRespondents could indicate yes to more than one category
bQuestion only asked of those indicating that they had cared for someone
Questions: 
A. Did you care for others outside of work who became ill with an influenza- like illness, whether
confirmed as H1N1 or not, between May and September this year? Tick all that apply.
B. In caring for others (outside of work) with an influenza-like illness, how many days (if any) did 
you miss work?
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Table A-14. Factorsa causing ED staff to miss work during H1N1 pandemic
Factors Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
Concern about 
falling ill with 
H1N1, no. (%)
   
Yes 9 (2) 6 (3) 2 (1) 1 (1) 0.13
No 489 (98) 168 (97) 147 (99) 162 (99)  
Total 498 (100) 174 (100) 149 (100) 163 (100)  
No answer 120 3 2 3  
Concern about 
exposing 
family 
members to 
H1N1 (2009) no. 
(%)
Yes 12 (2) 7 (4) 4 (3) 1 (1) 0.13
No 484 (98) 166 (96) 145 (97) 161 (99)  
Total 496 (100) 173 (100) 149 (100) 162 (100)  
No answer 122 4 2 4  
Closure of 
children's 
school, no. (%)
Yes 8 (2) 3 (2) 2 (1) 3 (2) 0.94
No 487 (98) 170 (98) 146 (99) 159 (98)  
Total 495 (100) 173 (100) 148 (100) 162 (100)  
No answer 123 4 3 4  
Being 
quarantined, 
no. (%)
Yes 24 (5) 8 (5) 5 (3) 10 (6) 0.52
No 472 (95) 165 (95) 143 (97) 153 (94)  
Total 496 (100) 173 (100) 148 (100) 163 (100)  
No answer 122 4 3 3  
Extreme stress, 
no. (%)
Yes 15 (3) 7 (4) 4 (3) 4 (3) 0.67
No 480 (97) 166 (96) 145 (97) 158 (97)  
Total 495 (100) 173 (100) 149 (100) 162 (100)  
No answer 123 3 2 4  
Increased 
workload, no. 
(%)
Yes 22 (4) 11 (6) 4 (3) 7 (4) 0.29
No 473 (96) 162 (94) 145 (97) 154 (96)  
Total 495 (100) 173 (100) 149 (100) 161 (100)  
No answer 123 4 2 5  
aFactors other their own or others’ ILI.
Question: Did any of the following factors cause you to miss work during the H1N1 pandemic, 
between May and September this year? Please do not include any scheduled time off nor any time off 
for your own others’ ILI-associated illness.
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Table A-15. ED staff redeployment during H1N1 pandemic
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
A. Redeployed 
from usual 
workplace, no. 
(%)
    
Yes 42    (8) 8 (5) 5 (3) 28 (17)  
No 461 (91) 166 (94) 146 (97) 138 (83) <.001
Don’t remember 2      (0) 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Total 505 (100) 176 (100) 151 (100) 166 (100)  
No answer 113 1 0 0  
B. Reason for 
redeploymenta, 
no. (%)
Personal risk 
factorsb
6 (15) 5 (63) 0 (0) 1 (4) <.001
Other 
operational 
reasons
33 (85) 3 (38) 4 (100) 25 (96)  
Total 39 (100) 8 (100) 4 (100) 26 (100)  
No answer 3 0 1 2  
aquestion only asked of those indicating ‘yes’ to above question
bfor severe illness from H1N1
Questions: 
A. At any time during the H1N1 pandemic (May–September 2009), were you redeployed from 
your usual workplace?
B. What was the primary reason for your redeployment during the H1N1 pandemic (May–
September 2009)?
Table A-16. Action and intention with vaccination against H1N1 (2009)
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
A. Already 
vaccinated 
against H1N1 
(2009) no. (%)
Yes 130 (26) 40 (23) 35 (23) 54 (33)  
No 370 (73) 132 (75) 116 (77) 112 (67) 0.007
Prefer not to 
answer
6 (1) 5 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0)  
Total 506 (100) 177 (100) 151 (100) 166 (100)  
No answer 118 0 0 0  
B. Intend to get 
vaccinateda, 
no. (%)
1 Definitely not 75 (20) 22 (16) 20 (17) 32 (29)  
2 Probably not 109 (29) 41 (30) 35 (30) 32 (29)  
3 Unsure 76 (21) 27 (20) 20 (17) 26 (23) 0.05
4 Probably yes 77 (21) 35 (26) 26 (23) 12 (11)  
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Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
5 Definitely yes 35 (9) 10 (7) 14 (12) 10 (9)  
Total 372 (100) 135 (100) 115 (100) 112 (100)  
Can't rate 2 1 1 0  
No answer 2 1 0 0  
Intend to get 
vaccinated, 
mean (SD)
2.70 (1.26) 2.78 (1.21) 2.82 (1.30) 2.43 (1.26) 0.04
aOnly asked of those answering ‘No’ or ‘Prefer not to answer’ to the previous question
Questions: 
A. Have you already been vaccinated against the H1N1 flu?
B. Do you intend to get vaccinated against the H1N1 virus?
Table A-17. Staff opinions about H1N1 topics
Total Registrar SMO Nurse P value
A. Is H1N1 
(2009) a ‘health 
emergency,’ no. 
(%)
Yes 218 (44) 70 (40) 62 (41) 80 (48)  
No 214 (43) 79 (45) 69 (46) 65 (39) 0.53
Unsure 68 (14) 27 (15) 19 (13) 21 (13)  
Total 500 (100) 176 (100) 150 (100) 166 (100)  
No answer 118 1 1 0  
B. EDs take 
responsibility 
for managing, 
no. (%)
Yes 135 (27) 55 (31) 34 (23) 45 (27)  
No 287 (57) 91 (52) 99 (66) 93 (56) 0.12
Unsure 78 (16) 30 (17) 17 (11) 28 (17)  
Total 500 (100) 176 (100) 150 (100) 166 (100)  
No answer 118 1 1 0  
Questions:  
A. In your opinion, is H1N1 infection a “health emergency?” 
B. In your opinion, should EDs take responsibility for managing pandemic influenza?
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
B-1
B: Emergency department directors’ survey tables
Table B-1. Demographics of survey respondents’ hospitals and EDs
A. Jurisdiction, no. (%)  
ACT 0 (0)
NT 1 (11)
NSW 5 (56)
Qld 1 (11)
SA 1 (11)
Tas 0 (0)
WA 1 (11)
Totala 9 (100)
B. Total hospital size (beds), no. (%)
1–249 4 (40)
250–499 4 (40)
500–749 2 (20)
750 or more 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
C. Hospital type, no. (%)
Public 9 (90)
Private 1 (10)
Mixed 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
D. ACEM role designation of ED, no. (%)
Major Referral / Tertiary 3 (33)
Urban District / Other Capital City 4 (44)
Major Regional / Rural Base 2 (22)
Rural Emergency Service 0 (0)
Primary Care / Remote Emergency Service 0 (0)
Total 9 (100)
E. Medical staffing FTE, no. (%)b
1–10 1 (11)
11–20 0 (0)
21–30 3 (33)
31–40 2 (22)
41–50 3 (33)
Total 9 (100)
F. Nursing staffing FTE, no. (%)b
1–30 1 (14)
31–60 2 (29)
61–90 3 (43)
91 or more 1 (14)
Total 7 (100)
F. Dedicated biohazard and isolation beds in ED, no. (%)
0 2 (22)
1 4 (44)
2 2 (22)
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3 1 (11)
Total 9 (100)
G. Annual census of patient presentations, 2008, no. (%)c  
0–20000 1 (11)
21000–40000 3 (33)
41000–60000 5 (56)
Total 9 (100)
aVIC (Victoria) was inadvertently left off the list in the survey.  
bGroupings defined after data collection, based on distribution.  
Note: The demographic questions appeared at the end of the survey; four respondents did not 
answer any of the questions.   
Table B-2. Infectious disease wards and flu clinics
A. Infectious disease ward, no. (%)
Yes 7 (54)
No 6 (46)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 13 (100)
No answer 1
B. Flu clinic in health service district, no. (%)
Yes 9 (64)
No 4 (29)
Don’t know 1 (7)
Total 14 (100)
No answer 0
C. Flu clinic—on/off sitea, no. (%)
On-site, within ED 1 (13)
On-site, outside ED (within hospital) 4 (50)
Off-site 3 (37)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 8 (100)
No answer 1
D. flu clinic—primary responsibilitya, no. (%)
Emergency department 3 (38)
Other hospital department 2 (25)
Shared (hospital and community) 0 (0)
Community organisation 1 (12)
Otherb 2 (25)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 8 (100)
No answer 1
E. Who staffed the flu clinica,c, no. (%)
ED staff 4 (50)
Other hospital staff 6 (75)
GPs 0 (0)
Infection Control / Public health staff 0 (0)
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
B-3
Community health staff 1 (12)
Otherd 1 (12)
Don’t know 0 (0)
aOnly asked of those responding ‘yes’ to question A.
bOpen responses: Administration, other hospital
cMultiple answers possible. 
dWritten-in response: ED staff from the other hospital
Questions: 
A. Does your hospital have a designated infectious disease ward or facility?
B. During the H1N1 pandemic, was a Flu Clinic set up in your health service district?
C. Was this Flu Clinic on your hospital’s grounds (on-site) or off-site?
D. Who had the primary responsibility for the Flu Clinic?
E. Who staff the Flu Clinic?  Tick all that apply.
Table B-3. Pandemic and disaster plans
A. Pandemic plan exist, no. (%)  
Yes, as part of hospital plan 10 (83)
Yes, stand-alone ED plan 1 (8)
No 1 (8)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 12 (100)
No answer 2
B. Pandemic plan activated, no (%)  
Yes 7 (70)
No 3 (30)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 0
C. Pandemic plan—how useful, no. (%)
1 Not at all useful 0 (0)
2 1 (17)
3 2 (33)
4 2 (33)
5 Very useful 1 (17)
Total 6 (100)
Can’t rate 0
No answer 1
Pandemic plan—how useful, mean (SD) 3.5 (1.05)
D. Disaster plan activated, no. (%)  
Yes 0 (0)
No 11 (100)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 11 (100)
No answer 3
aQuestion asked only of those indicating “yes” to question A.
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bQuestion only asked of those answering “yes” to question B.
Questions: 
A. Was there a written Pandemic Plan for your ED before the H1N1 pandemic earlier this year, that 
is before May 2009?
B. Was this Pandemic Plan activated during the H1N1 pandemic?
C. How useful was this Pandemic Plan in dealing with the H1N1 pandemic?
D. Did your hospital activate its formal Disaster Plan at any time during the H1N1 pandemic?
Table B-4. Clinical protocols for dealing with suspected H1N1 presentations?
A. Specific clinical protocol developed, no. (%)
Yes 10 (100)
No 0 (0)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
B. Changes to clinical protocol, no. (%)
Yes, multiple times 8 (80)
Yes, one time 1 (10)
No, no changes necessary 1 (10)
Don’t know 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
Questions: 
A. Was a specific clinical protocol developed to deal with suspected H1N1 presentations?
B. Did the clinical protocol for dealing with suspected H1N1 presentations have to be changed over 
the course of the pandemic (May to September 2009)?
Table B-5. Administrative measures employed during the (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza Pandemic
A1. Separate reception areas, no. (%)
Yes 3 (30)
No 7 (70)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
A2. Changed visiting policies, no. (%)
Yes 5 (50)
No 5 (50)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
A3. Referring cases to their GPs, no. (%)
Yes 4 (40)
No 6 (60)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
A4. Changes in overall model of care, no. (%)
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Yes 5 (50)
No 5 (50)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
B1. Separate reception areas, useful, no. (%)
Useful 2 (67)
Not useful 1 (33)
Total 3 (100)
Can’t rate 2
Not applicable 1
No answer 8
B2. Changed visiting policies, useful, no. (%)
Useful 4 (100)
Not useful 0 (0)
Total 4 (100)
Can’t rate 1
Not applicable 1
No answer 8
B3. Ref. cases to their GPs, useful, no. (%)
Useful 4 (100)
Not useful 0 (0)
Total 4 (100)
Can’t rate 2
Not applicable 0
No answer 8
B4. Changes. overall model of care, useful, no. (%)
Useful 6 (100)
Not useful 0 (0)
Total 6 (100)
Can’t rate 0
Not applicable 2
No answer 6
Questions: 
A. During the H1N1 pandemic (May through September 2009), did your Emergency Department 
institute any of the following administrative measures?
B. How useful were each of these measures in coping with the H1N1 pandemic?
Table B-6. Measures used to prevent the spread of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Influenza
A. Preventive measure used to prevent spread amongst patients and visitors, no. (%)a
  Isolation of H1N1 patientsb within the ED 10 (100)
  Transfer of H1N1 patients to special ward or isolation bay outside the ED 2 (20)
  Requiring H1N1 patients to wear surgical masks (if medically able) 10 (100)
  Providing antivirals to family members or contacts 4 (40)
  Providing masks to family members or patients with no inflenza-like illness 3 (30)
  Providing alcohol-based hand rubs 9 (90)
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  Signage (concerning cough etiquette and/or hand-washing techniques) 10 (100)
  Other (‘Removed nebulisers’) 1 (10)
B. Preventive measures used to prevent staff from becoming infected, no. (%)a  
  Antivirals (preventive) 2 (20)
  Alcohol-based hand rubs (increased availability) 10 (100)
  Standard surgical masks 6 (60)
  N95 or P2 respirators 8 (80)
  Redeployment of at-riskc staff to areas with a lower risk of exposure 8 (80)
  Other 0 (0)
aMore than one answer was possible
bSuspected or confirmed H1N1 patients (throughout table)
cAt risk of severe illness with H1N1 (e.g. pregnant, immuno-compromised, with chronic illness, 
etc.)
Questions: 
A. Which of the following measures did your Emergency Department implement during the H1N1 
pandemic to prevent spread of the virus to other patients and family members?
B. Which of the following preventive measures were employed in your ED specifically to protect 
staff from becoming infected?
Table B-7. Level of difficulty experienced in ED with following issues during 
the (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Pandemic
A. Increased demand, no. (%)  
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 1 (10)
3 0 (0)
4 4 (40)
5 Great deal of difficulty 5 (50)
Total 10 (100)
B. Patient or family aggression, no. (%)
1 No difficulty 2 (20)
2 5 (50)
3 2 (20)
4 0 (0)
5 Great deal of difficulty 1 (10)
Total 10 (100)
C. Access block (to ICU), no. (%)
1 No difficulty 1 (10)
2 2 (20)
3 3 (30)
4 2 (20)
5 Great deal of difficulty 2 (20)
Total 10 (100)
D. Access block (to other hospital wards), no. (%)
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 0 (0)
3 3 (30)
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4 4 (40)
5 Great deal of difficulty 3 (30)
Total 10 (100)
E. Lack of space for patients in ED, no. (%)
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 0 (0)
3 0 (0)
4 4 (40)
5 Great deal of difficulty 6 (60)
Total 10 (100)
F. Lack of supplies or equipment, no. (%)
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 2 (20)
3 2 (20)
4 6 (60)
5 Great deal of difficulty 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
G. Lack of medications or treatments, no. (%)
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 5 (50)
3 3 (30)
4 1 (10)
5 Great deal of difficulty 1 (10)
Total 10 (100)
Table 6. (cont.)  
H. Staff absenteeism, no. (%)  
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 2 (20)
3 2 (20)
4 6 (60)
5 Great deal of difficulty 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
I. Redeployment of at-risk ED staff, no. (%)  
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 8 (80)
3 2 (20)
4 0 (0)
5 Great deal of difficulty 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
J. Filling staff deficits, no. (%)
1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 2 (20)
3 2 (20)
4 4 (40)
5 Great deal of difficulty 2 (20)
Total 10 (100)
K. Falling below minimum skill mix requirements, no. (%)
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1 No difficulty 0 (0)
2 2 (20)
3 6 (60)
4 0 (0)
5 Great deal of difficulty 2 (20)
Total 10 (100)
NOTE: No respondents chose either “Not applicable” or “Can’t rate” for any of these items; four 
respondents did not respond to the whole matrix of items.
Question: Please rate the level of difficulty your ED experienced with the following issues during 
the H1N1 pandemic.  Choose a point on each scale below. 
Table B-8. Amount of sick or family leave taken by ED staff during the (H1N1) 
2009 Influenza Pandemic 
Response, no. (%)
More than usual for a normal flu season 5 (50)
About the same as a normal flu season 5 (50)
Less than usual for a normal flu season 0 (0)
Total 10 (100)
No answer 4
Question: Was the amount of sick/family leave taken by ED staff during the H1N1 pandemic:
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Table B-10. Comparison of after-hours ILI presentations 2009 versus previous 
years
Rates of after-hours presentations, no. (%)  
Higher percentage this year 3 (38)
About the same percentage this year 4 (50)
Lower percentage this year 1 (12)
Don't know 0 (0)
Total 8 (100)
No answer 6
Question: How did the rates of after-hour presentations of ILI this year compare with previous 
years?
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C: Qualitative data terms for Leximancer
During the data cleaning stage, terms were created to rationalise synonyms, contractions, and local 
terminology variants to facilitate text analysis in Leximancer. The terms used in Leximancer are:
ED(s)    Emergency Department, DEM, ED, ed, Ed and all other variants 
StateDept    State Health Department, DoH, DHS, QHealth, Qld Health, NSW Health 
etc
FedDept    Federal Health Department, DoHA
PubHealth    Public Health, local CDC, public health unit
LocHealthServ(s)  - local health service, area health service, SESIAHS
MajorHosp  Major referral hospital, Tertiary hospital, e.g. RCH, Austin, RBWH, RAH 
etc
WHO    World Health Organisation/Organization
FluHosp(s)    flu/influenza/fever hospital
FluClinic(s)    flu/influenza/fever clinic
SwineFluClinic(s)   swine/H1N1 flu/influenza/fever clinic
PathLab(s)   Pathology department/laboratory, VIDRL
HospIntranet(s)  hospital intranet, Groupwise, employer website
InfConDept(s)   Infection Control Department
IDward(s)   Infectious Diseases Ward, infectious diseases unit
OccHealth    OH&S, Occupational Health and Safety etc
Doctor    Dr, MO, Medical Officer
GP(s)    General Practitioner, LMO
Reg(s)     reg, registrar
PHO     principle house officer
EDCslt(s)   Emergency medicine consultant
EDdir(s)   Emergency department director
IDCslt(s)   Infectious diseases consultant
Nurse(s)   RN, Reg Nurse
CNC(s)   clinical nurse consultant
NUM(s)   nurse unit manager
NP(s)    nurse practitioner
SwineFlu    swine/pig flu, H1N1, H!N!, h1n1 etc
PPE    ppe, personal protective equipment
Antivirals    Tamiflu, tammy flu, relenza, oseltamivir, anti virals, antis, anti-virals
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   anti-viral medication, antiviral medication, antiviral drugs
Fluvax    seasonal influenza vaccine, seasonal vaccine, flu vax
Flu     flu, flue, influenza, seasonal flu
ILI     influenza like illness
ID     id, infectious diseases
MDV(s)   multidose vial, multi-dose vial
NIV     non-invasive positive pressure ventilation, BIPAP, CPAP
LOS    length of stay   
AtlantaCDC    US CDC, CDC American and variations, plus some plain CDC depend-
ing on context
email     e-mail, e mail, E-mail
diagnosis    Dx
history    Hx
investigation    Ix
management    Mx
prescription    Rx
treatment    Tx
symptoms    Sx, S&S, S+S
information   info
confusion    conf
patient(s)   pt
resusitation    resus
respiratory    resp
hospital    hosp
negative    --ve, -ve
positive    +ve  
nebuliser(s)   neb
paediatric(s)   paeds
The term ‘CDC’ proved to be a challenge, as it could refer to several states’ public health bodies, 
or the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. Where the context made it plain that one 
or the other of these was meant, it was changed accordingly. Where it is impossible to tell from 
context it was changed to C.D.C.
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D: Ethics approval
Professor Gerry FitzGerald MD FACEM, FRACMA, School of Public 
Health Queensland University of Technology Victoria Park Road Kel-
vin Grove Qld 4059 Mobile 0439 772383 Phone +61 7 31383935 Fax +61 
7 31383369
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Research Ethics [mailto:ethicscontact@qut.edu.au]
Sent: Tuesday, 11 August 2009 12:02 PM
To: Gerard Fitzgerald
Cc: Research Ethics
Subject: Ethics Application Approval: Emergency department im-
pact and patient profile of H1N1 influenza 09 outbreak in Austra-
lia: A national survey.
Dear Prof Gerard Fitzgerald
Project Title:
Emergency department impact and patient profile of H1N1 influ-
enza 09 outbreak in Australia: A national survey
Ethics Number:         0900000807
Clearance Until:        11/08/2012
Ethics Category:        Human
This email is to advise that your application has been re-
viewed and confirmed as meeting the requirements of the National 
Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research. 
Whilst the data collection of your project has received ethical 
clearance, the decision to commence and authority to commence 
may be dependant on factors beyond the remit of the ethics re-
view process. For example, your research may need ethics clear-
ance from other organisations or permissions from other organ-
isations to access staff. Therefore the proposed data collection 
should not commence until you have satisfied these requirements.
Please note following:
************
Please supply final versions of recruitment emails, PICFs, sur-
veys etc prior to use
************
If you require a formal approval certificate, please respond 
via reply email and one will be issued.
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Decisions related to low risk ethical review are subject to 
ratification at the next available Committee meeting. You will 
only be contacted again in relation to this matter if the Com-
mittee raises any additional questions or concerns.
This project has been awarded ethical clearance until 
11/08/2012 and a progress report must be submitted for an active 
ethical clearance at least once every twelve months. Researchers 
who fail to submit an appropriate progress report may have their 
ethical clearance revoked and/or the ethical clearances of other 
projects suspended. When your project has been completed please 
advise us by email at your earliest convenience.
For variations, please complete and submit an online variation 
form:
     http://www.research.qut.edu.au/ethics/forms/hum/var/var.
jsp
Please do not hesitate to contact the unit if you have any 
queries.
Regards
Research Ethics Unit | Office of Research Level 4 | 88 Musk Ave 
| Kelvin Grove
p: +61 7 3138 5123  |  f: +61 7 3138 1304
e: ethicscontact@qut.edu.au  |  w: http://www.research.qut.
edu.au/ethics/
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza Outbreak in Australia: Impact on Emergency Departments.
D-3

